"The recent period, especially last week, has witnessed a series of events that reflect no significant change on the ground, but do have significant future import in that they indicate the erosion of Israeli deterrence," contends Palestinian commentator Hani al-Masri on the independent Palestinian news-portal www.masarat.ps.
20 Israelis have been killed and over 130 injured since the beginning of the year. A bombing was carried out in Megiddo [northern Israel], allegedly by a militant coming from Lebanon, but the precise background of this operation has yet to be deciphered. A drone flew into Israeli airspace from Syria and was shot down. 34 rockets were fired from Southern Lebanon at Israel in the biggest incident of its kind since 2006. Three rockets were also fired from Syria at Israeli targets in the occupied Golan Heights and 44 more rockets were launched from Gaza at Israeli settlements in the Gaza envelope.
On the flipside, Israeli occupation forces carried out a spate of major operations in Syria in early April, killing a number of Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers. Settler gangs have continued their incursions during Ramadan, especially since the beginning of the Jewish holiday of Passover. Israeli occupation forces brutalized worshipers holding vigil in the Aqsa Mosque so as to facilitate and protect settler incursions, perpetuating the division of the Holy compound's space and visiting hours. Matters have gradually taken a dangerous new turn since 2001, especially since 2003, when the police decided to allow Jews to visit the Aqsa Mosque compound in small numbers under guard. The situation has dramatically escalated since 2015, with the number of interlopers into the Aqsa Mosque compound numbering 34,000 in 2021 and over 50,000 in 2022.
Access to the Aqsa Mosque compound has also been divided into different time slots for Jews and Muslims, with Jews allocated from 7:30-11:00 a.m., 1:30-2:30 p.m., and a third slot in the afternoon. Religious groups are also striving to allocate other days for visiting the Mosque compound during the Jewish holidays, which add up to 100 days a year-- as well as all Saturdays, numbering 50 days-- on top of their efforts to appropriate certain areas and corners of the compound, allocate them to Jews, and convert them into [Jewish] temples for prayers.
Moreover, the [Jewish] organizations devoted to the Temple Mount [Aqsa compound], which number over 50, clearly and explicitly advocate and pursue the construction of the fabled [Jewish] temple on the ruins of the holy Aqsa mosque, which the Palestinians oppose and denounce. To illustrate the difference between events of the past and what has transpired this year, we highlight the grave mistake made by the Jordanian Waqf [religious authority granted jurisdiction over Jerusalem's Muslim holy sites], with cover from the Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh [US-sponsored Arab/Israeli/Palestinian] summits, in deciding to limit overnight vigils in the Mosque compound to the last ten days of Ramadan.
Overnight vigils in large numbers should be held continuously throughout the month of Ramadan, and even throughout the year, because vigils are not just a form of worship, but a patriotic act of the first order. Without them, division of al-Aqsa's space and hours [between Muslims and Jews] will be perpetuated and will open the door to even more dire phases. It is worth noting that the brutal Israeli crackdowns have led to a decrease in the number of Muslim worshipers and people holding vigil, and a solution must be found for the coming days and moving forward.
To illustrate the difference between the so-called 'historic status quo' and the situation today, the Aqsa Mosque in all its parts, including the Wailing Wall (which is now called the Western Wall), was a designated place for Muslims under the Ottoman Empire, the British mandate, and Jordanian rule. Others were allowed by the Waqf to visit for touristic purposes, not to perform religious rites. The situation today is totally different. The scheme is completely transparent, especially since the current Israeli government took office. [National Security] Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and [Finance] Minister Bezalel Smotrich have called for Jews and Muslims to have equal use of the Aqsa Mosque compound, such that Jews can enter from all gates at all times, and special areas are allocated for Jewish prayers, in a manner reminiscent to what has happened to the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron [since 1995].
For the facts regarding the resistance and aggression in the period from April 1st- 8th, we refer to a report issued by Orouba Center for Research. Israeli occupation forces and settlers carried out 247 attacks against Palestinians, including some 100 raids into West Bank cities and towns. Settlers carried out 50 attacks, leading to four deaths and the arrest of 250 Palestinians, while Palestinian territories witnessed about 300 clashes with the occupation forces and settlers, including over 100 featuring armed resistance.
Some view the rocket fire from Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria as a manifestation of the 'unity of fronts' doctrine, marking a change in the rules of the game and the balance of deterrence. Others, however, believe what happened to be an attempt on the part of Iran and its axis to rescue Israel from its current internal crisis, which has reached unprecedented heights auguring dire consequences, especially if the government and opposition were to fail to reach a settlement [over judicial reforms] in the coming phase.
But setting aside fearmongering and disparagement, what happened was an attempt on the part of the Palestinian resistance, backed by Hezbollah, to test Israel's capacity for deterrence in retaliation for Israeli escalation in al-Aqsa and Syria, amid the unprecedented crisis currently sweeping Israel. The evidence is that the rockets launched from Lebanon and Syria were [Soviet-style] Grad and Katyusha class. The [Israeli-built anti-missile system] Iron Dome intercepted most of them, but the rest fell in uninhabited areas and caused no significant damage or human losses. Likewise, Israel's response many hours later targeted three uninhabited sites, as did the response from Gaza to the Israeli aggression.
The fact that it was calculated and deliberate on both sides indicates that the various parties do not want to enter a major military conflict, but without refraining from military action entirely so as to improve their position. This goes for both sides, and not Israel alone, as has often been the case in the course of what is known as the [Israeli] 'campaign between the wars' targeting Syria and Iran, especially the former, with acts of sabotage, air strikes, shelling, and assassinations since 2013.
Opening up the Lebanese and Syrian fronts reflects the potential for the rules of the game to begin to change thanks to attempts to exploit the crisis Israel is passing through, which has weakened it, especially since this has been accompanied by a crisis in U.S./Israeli relations. These changes have an effect on its deterrent powers arising from the attempt to keep abreast of the changes the world and the region are witnessing in the wake of the Ukraine war, and especially in the wake of the tripartite Beijing [Iran/Saudi/Chinese] agreement, which was followed by a Chinese/Saudi/Iranian foreign ministers' meeting to begin its implementation even before the agreed deadline in less than two months.
This prompted CIA Director William Burns to pay a secret visit to Riyadh. According to the Wall Street Journal, he expressed astonishment and shock at the rapid changes in Saudi relations with Iran and China, as reflected in various dossiers, from the Yemen dossier through expedited efforts to turn the page on the war, to the Syrian dossier, as there is a high probability of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad participating in the May Riyadh Arab Summit. This in turn will have an impact on remaining dossiers such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, well as the Iranian nuclear dossier.
As we assess and evaluate the potential scenarios, we must take into account the regional and international constraints preventing the outbreak of a regional war, in light of the world's preoccupation with the Ukraine war's fallout and the mounting competition between China and the U.S.
Saudi Arabia wants calm until it stops bleeding from the Yemen war and eliminates the prospects of war with Iran. It also want to move forward with the implementation of its NEOM and Vision 2030 projects, also in light of the Iranian crisis stemming from ongoing blockade, sanctions, and internal protests and the stalled nuclear deal negotiations, not to mention the disastrous conditions in Syria and Lebanon, and the need for calm to proceed with reconstruction, complete the liberation of Syria, install a Lebanese president, and extract oil and gas.
However, the constraints on a regional war do not prevent, but rather permit, forms of military engagement such as those witnessed in the past week on a bigger or smaller scale, as long as it does not reach the point of a major war, although there is no 100% guarantee against that.
This scenario is reinforced by the fact that although Israel is weakened and its strategic position has deteriorated, as attested by Israeli think tanks, commentators, and leaders, it remains strong. When necessary, it will receive U.S. support, transcending the dispute with the current Israeli government. The U.S./Israeli alliance is an organic one, and Washington's need for Tel Aviv has increased in light of Gulf states opting to normalize relations with Iran and Turkey, and diversify their strategic ties. Now no longer limited to alliance with the U.S., they have begun to forge strong ties with China and Russia.
All this notwithstanding, the possibility of the occupation government mounting a major military strike against one of these fronts should not be discounted, the most likely candidates being the West Bank and Gaza (either or both). Meanwhile, it will continue its attacks on Syria, but not now, in the coming days or weeks, after the end of the holiday season, assuming developments do not speed up or delay the timeline, so as to prevent a consolidation of the unity of arenas and fronts, as well as allow the Israeli government to save face after promising to act decisively and totally eradicate the Palestinian resistance lest it become a laughingstock to Israelis in both government and opposition before anyone else. Therefore, it is necessary for the rest of Ramadan to pass with the least possible clashes.
Upon taking stock of the sheer outrage among government and opposition circles towards weak Israeli responses and the calls from prominent Likud and Religious Zionism party government figures to carry out assassinations, mount another Operation Defensive Shield [as in 2002] in Nablus and Jenin, and continue to ramp up the 'campaign between the wars', one will find the scenario of Israel singling out the West Bank, Gaza, or Syria, or all three to be very likely.
It is necessary to prepare for this, especially now that the occupation army has called up its reservist forces and PM Netanyahu has met with the leader of the opposition twice to relay security briefings and ensure that the opposition stands behind the army and the government. The sharp decline in the influence of Likud and the parties to the government coalition as indicated by several polls, only reinforces the government's needs to rehabilitate its damaged deterrence doctrine. The likelihood is that this will grow, should rocket fire from the Gaza Strip and devastating resistance operations in the West Bank continue, and if it were to be revealed that the [Palestinian] factions in Gaza were involved or responsible.
"The remaining question is this: To what extent will Iran and Hezbollah allow Israel to single out the Palestinian arena and Syria?" asks Masri in conclusion.
