"The Egyptian capital has been witnessing intense diplomatic activity," notes Palestinian commentator Hani al-Masri on the independent Palestinian news-portal www.masarat.ps.
It began with a visit from a ministerial delegation led by PM Mohammad Shtayyeh, which was marked by great warmth, with Egyptian PM Mustafa Madbouly greeting Shtayyeh at the airport. The visit also included a meeting with Intelligence Director 'Abbas Kamel and concluded with signing several agreements in various fields.
It is worth noting that Cairo invited separate delegations from Hamas and Islamic Jihad and requested that they be formed from the highest-ranking officials. It also extended a parallel invitation to a governmental delegation representing the de factoestablishment in Gaza. The purpose here is not to discuss reconciliation and achieving unity, as that appears to have become a thing of the past, but rather to strengthen the ruling establishment in the Gaza Strip and reach a relatively long-term truce. This will create the opportunity to pursue strategic projects in the context of developing Egyptian relations with the Gaza Strip, especially on matters of trade, economy, and security, since Egypt accounts for 35% of overall commercial exchange with the Strip according to some sources, and 50% according to others. This is significant in that the funds generated from the exchange of goods will return in full to the Hamas establishment, allowing a larger volume of imports free of Israel's total control. The point here is that the topics under discussion will greatly impact future Palestinian conditions.
It is also worth noting that this momentum comes in the wake of Operation Revenge of the Free. If the fighting had continued, the battle was at risk of expanding to include the Qassam Brigades and other factions. Does this mean that it has become easier to achieve a long-term truce and strategic projects? If – and only if – these efforts are successful, the expected outcome will be that the PA in Ramallah grows weaker while Hamas' ruling establishment and government grows stronger (especially with the Qatari grant and permits for Gazans to work within the Green Line), but at the expense of the Qassam Brigades, since the conditions of the blockade will not be improved as an act of charity, but will come at a price for the Palestinian side.
The most significant implication of these developments is that the split is deepening and that the presence of the [Gaza/Hamas] ruling establishment is necessary (as a legitimized entity) because this presence is required for several issues, such as fulfilling the remaining commitments towards the Strip, the delivery of international aid earmarked for it, and the extraction of gas from the Gaza Marine field. Therefore, the presence of a legitimate authority is necessary, as is the presence of Egypt in its capacity as a state, since such agreements are concluded with states, and of Israel in its capacity as the occupying power in this situation.
A truce must be established until arrangements are complete. Since a permanent truce is impossible because it would strip Hamas of the justification for its existence and legitimacy as a resistance movement, the discussion is focused on a long-term, temporary truce that lasts several years.
It is not in any party's interest for Israeli attacks on the Strip to continue every few years, and lately every year. This leads Gaza to suffer grave human and material losses and Israel to sustain various losses of its own, especially in the Gaza envelope settlements.
What is happening is a foregone conclusion.
First: It is a result of the Israeli policy based on the strategy of not occupying the Gaza Strip, for several reasons. The first is the potential losses Israel may incur. Second, there is a lack of clarity regarding which party might replace Hamas in power. The Ramallah-based PA has been severely weakened by continued incursions, assassinations, and arrests, Israel's failure to abide by its commitments pursuant to the Oslo Accords, and its refusal to resume negotiations and the political process, not to mention internal conflicts and rifts in Fatah and rivalries over succession. As a result, the PA is unable to return to Gaza and may be unwilling to do so. And if it did return, it would be incapable of ruling it, whereas the Israeli government would not want to stay in the Strip in the event that it occupies it. Third, and most importantly, Israel has adopted a strategy since the split based on preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state. Therefore, it is a central Israeli objective to perpetuate, deepen, and expand the split, regardless of the government in power.
Second: All attempts and initiatives to end the split have failed so abjectly that there has come to be a growing resignation, acceptance, and tolerance of it.
Third: Arab and regional parties range between those that back one side of the split, those that back the other, and those that are indifferent and preoccupied with their own concerns. This helps perpetuate the split. On the international front, some parties support Israel whether it is the oppressor or oppressed, as in the case of the U.S. and the UK. Others, like Europe and the UN among many others, want a political process, the realization of the 'two-state solution, and the end of the split, but they use the split as an excuse for not doing their part.
There remains one crucial point: How can the resistance factions, whose people and homeland are under settler-colonialist, racist, occupation without prospects for a settlement that achieves minimal Palestinian rights, accept a temporary years-long truce that could lead to a long-term ceasefire? This question is pressing especially in the presence of an Israeli government whose agenda is to quickly settle the conflict with the Palestinians through settlement expansion, greater Judaization, assassinations, home demolitions, arrests, and more crimes and internal displacement so as to fulfill the conditions for annexing Area C as a prelude to a later phase of voluntary and forced displacement abroad of Palestinians en masse.
One might argue that the Gaza Strip remains a support base for the resistance in the West Bank, which is more effective than rocket fire. But its margin of maneuver here is limited, because the occupation state will not allow the resistance in Gaza to back and strengthen the resistance in the West Bank while also enjoying the advantages of improved blockade conditions and a long-term truce. Therefore, a years-long truce in Gaza ill sooner or later lead to a truce in the West Bank.
Some may argue that a war on all fronts is coming, and it will be a battle of decisive victory that embodies the unity of arenas. But this is just a potential scenario, and not the most likely one. The area, and indeed the entire region, is witnessing a climate of inter-Arab reconciliations as well as Arab reconciliations with regional powers, including Israel, and efforts to eradicate problems, to the point of resuming negotiations on the Iranian nuclear dossier.
Although the Palestinian resistance has much in common with Iran and Hezbollah, there are differences separating them. Iran prioritizes its own interests, and it backs and utilizes the Palestinian cause only insofar as it serves Iranian interests. This is the prevailing approach in this world. Tehran will not go to war with Israel in support of the Palestinian cause unless it serves Iranian interests. Otherwise, why have we not witnessed an Iranian/Israeli war despite everything the Israeli governments have done to the Palestinians, and despite the ongoing hostility and escalating tension between the two sides? And why have we not seen a war between Hezbollah and Israel since 2006? Of course, we must not discount the importance of the power imbalance due to Tel Aviv's organic relationship with Washington.
Iran realizes that it will take time for it to be able to wage a war that it can win. However, if war is foisted on it, it will have no choice but to fight. Still, it will not initiate war until further notice.
Furthermore, we must consider the feasibility of Palestinian participation in an Iranian/Israeli war and not assume it to be a given in all cases, especially if it was not Palestine that triggered it. This is because in the event of a regional war, there are Israeli plans in place to internally and externally displace Palestinians from within the Green Line and the West Bank under security pretexts.
Moreover, making all these arrangements requires a democratic process. The Cairo talks are between the de facto forces in both areas [the West Bank and Gaza], which are illegitimate in the absence of elections and national consensus, and with the failure to include or even consult the forces, NGOs, return committees, communities, and prominent figures of the Palestinian diaspora.
Wishful thinking opens the door to the devil's work, as they say. If there existed Palestinian unity and a will based on a shared vision and strategies that combine various forms of struggle, with a focus on boycotting, legal prosecution, demanding rights, and popular resistance as the primary method, then there would be opportunities that far outweigh the challenges and risks by far. So why not take advantage of the wave of Arab and regional reconciliations to include the Palestinian arena?
"That would require will, awareness, initiative, and ongoing popular, political, and public pressure," concludes Masri.
