"The Israeli attack on Iran was not as devastating and unprecedented as Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu had threatened," maintains Palestinian commentator Hani al-Masri on Tuesday's independent Palestinian news-portal www.masarat.ps.
Nor was it innovative, leaving Iran uncertain of what had happened to it, as Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant had warned. It fell far short of the threats, but was still more than a symbolic response. This is consistent with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's warning against either exaggerating the response or downplaying it.
With this strong, yet tamer than alleged, Israeli response, Netanyahu's government missed a big opportunity to achieve the grand goals the PM had spoken of, which included destroying Iran's nuclear program, reshaping the Middle East, weakening the axis of resistance, and creating a different security climate in the region lasting decades to come at least. This outcome can be attributed to several reasons:
First: It may be that Tel Aviv is unable to wage war against Iran alone. This seems to be a sound assessment and explains why Israel has not struck Iran's nuclear reactor all these years, despite Tehran drawing close to obtaining a nuclear bomb and strengthening its defenses, especially since Israel has started to feel fatigued after more than a year of war on multiple fronts and needs a break to catch its breath.
Second: It may also be that the war has exhausted itself, and there are no targets left to strike beyond wreaking destruction for the sake of destruction and death for the sake of death. There is an increasing need to end the war, even under the guise of declaring an 'Israeli victory' and pursuing other means to achieve the objectives through economics, politics, negotiations, and exploiting internal Palestinian, Lebanese, and Arab disputes. This is evidenced by the return of disagreements within the Israeli government, to the point that Netanyahu promised the religious camp to dismiss Gallant once the current round of the conflict with Iran concludes.
Moreover, there are disputes between the government, the occupation army, and security agencies over Israel's goals in the war and whether or not most of them have been met, as the defense minister, army officials, and security agencies see it. This is apparent from the support for the Egyptian initiative and the demand to make concessions, because, as Gallant stated, military achievements alone are insufficient. There is a need to update the objectives of the war given its changing nature and the resurgent threats against Israel, making painful concessions necessary to secure the captives' release. Meanwhile, Netanyahu, along with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, believe the government's goals have not been met and that their objectives are far greater than the declared goals. Furthermore, they seek the resistance's surrender, not a political solution with it.
Third: The far-right government may have surrendered to the U.S's wishes and will. This is exactly true. Washington does not want a strong attack against Iran that could lead to a regional war on the eve of the U.S. elections, especially with the ongoing war in Ukraine and while Tehran holds strong cards empowering it to cause a global economic crisis if it closes international straits or targets U.S. bases and oil installations in the region.
There is also concern that China might exploit the war to its advantage or be forced to intervene if its interests are threatened, such as through disruptions to oil imports or trade, given China's status as the world's leading market. Netanyahu's government knows deep down, despite its bluster, that there are limits to its power and Israel cannot wage a war with Iran alone and win without full U.S. participation.
Fourth: Israel may have feared an Iranian response stronger than Operations True Promise 1 & 2 to a harsh attack, as promised. Israel striking Iranian nuclear reactors could spur Iran to decide to acquire a nuclear bomb, which would take only one week according to CIA Director William Burns.
A stronger Iranian response than the previous ones would be intolerable for the Israeli home front, which is already strained after sustaining nearly 2,000 deaths and many times more injuries according to official sources, and likely even more according to unofficial Israeli sources. This is especially so now that Hezbollah has regained the initiative, as demonstrated by the scale and organization of its missile and drone attacks and the valiant resistance on display in the South, causing 73 Israeli deaths and many times more injuries in October. This is the highest toll in a single month since Operation al-Aqsa Flood except October 2023.
Despite the Israeli military's achievements, which brought political and military leaders temporary euphoria, thinking they had removed Hezbollah from the battle, the party proved that it remains strong. It regrouped, preventing the occupation forces from advancing significantly. This has led Gallant and Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi to start to talk about halting the ground war without achieving the declared objectives.
Fifth: There may be a need to choose the right timing, make more thorough preparations, and install defensive systems to prevent most, if not all, Iranian missiles and drones from reaching their targets, as indicated by the deployment of the U.S.-made THAAD defense system, so that a potential Iranian response can be absorbed with minimal losses before proceeding to mount a devastating counter-response.
It is likely that Israel has considered all possibilities and that Netanyahu's government will not miss any opportunity to destroy Iran's capabilities, especially its military, oil, and nuclear resources, if it can do so without incurring an unbearable cost.
Answering the question of whether the countdown to the end of the aggression has begun brings us to three key issues:
The first issue is that the battlefield, above all else, will determine whether the Israeli aggression stops. What happens on the ground is reflected in the negotiations, and what is not achieved on the battlefield will not be achieved at the negotiating table.
If Israeli casualties continue at the same rate as in October or increase, Netanyahu's government may not be able to sustain the aggression for long. Therefore, the coming month is crucial for determining whether matters will unfold towards the continuation of war or its end. Should Israeli casualties continue to stack up, disputes will intensify within the Israeli government and between the government, army and security agencies, and the Israeli public opinion will turn after the initial intoxication over the assassinations and pager and walkie-talkie attacks that led to very high support for the government wears off and the public comes back to its senses.
The second issue is the likelihood of a regional war occurring. The greater the chance of it breaking out, the more U.S. pressure will be applied on Netanyahu's government, for the reasons mentioned earlier in the article, in addition to the U.S. deep state believing that blockade, sanctions, fomenting internal unrest, and a carrot-and-stick approach can either change Iran's policies or bring down the regime if it does not change course.
Another factor is the U.S. need to keep the Iranian threat alive to ensure that Arab regimes, especially Gulf ones, align with U.S. policies. However, this reason became less compelling once Saudi Arabia sought U.S. support under both Barack Obama and Donald Trump after facing attacks from the Houthis without receiving the help it needed, leading to the conclusion that no one will protect the Arabs but the Arabs themselves.
The third issue is the U.S. presidential election results. If Donald Trump wins, he will revive the 'deal of the century', which seeks to liquidate the Palestinian cause and would empower Netanyahu to act freely, according to leaked phone conversations and his public statements. Trump has even stated Israel's area is too small and should be expanded. If he wins, the annexation of Northern Gaza and the displacement of its population may become a more serious proposition, as would establishing buffer and safe zones along the border and on the Egyptian/Palestinian front.
Sources report that Trump promised Miriam Adelson to support the annexation of Area C, particularly the settlements, to Israel in exchange for a $100 million donation to his campaign – just as he previously promised her husband to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem before his last win and fulfilled that promise.
Yes, Kamala Harris would support Israel and champion its so-called right to self-defense, but she would favor Israel's less hardline and racist factions and parties, whereas Trump would back the most hardline elements. Despite betting on neither side, it is still crucial to recognize the differences between them. Politics, after all, is the art of the possible, and it requires discerning even the smallest of distinctions. Otherwise, there can be no politics.
The battlefield and its surprises remain the decisive factor. Without steadfastness and resistance inflicting casualties, there would be no limit to how far Israeli forces might go.
"As David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first and most important prime minister, once said, Israel's borders are defined by the positions of its soldiers," concludes Masri.