PLAN'S KEY POINTS: "Media outlets have reported on the key points of the Arab plan to be discussed at the meeting scheduled to take place in Riyadh on Thursday," notes Palestinian commentator Hani al-Masri on Tuesday's Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab news portal www.alaraby.co.uk.

The agreed-upon terms will then be presented at the Arab Summit, set to be held in Cairo on February 27. Reuters reports, citing Arab officials, that the plan involves forming a national Palestinian committee to govern Gaza without Hamas involvement, international cooperation on reconstruction without displacing Palestinians, and movement towards a two-state solution. A buffer zone and physical barrier would also be erected to stop tunnels being built across Gaza's border with Egypt. As soon as rubble is removed, 20 areas would be established as temporary living zones. Around 50 Egyptian and other foreign companies would be brought in to carry out the work. A building fund will also be established, potentially named the Trump Fund for Reconstruction.

An Arab official stated that forcing Hamas to relinquish any role in Gaza would be critical. Similarly, Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit emphasized the importance of Hamas stepping aside, arguing that it serves Palestinian interests. Other media sources have reported that disarming the resistance in Gaza and deporting Hamas leaders and cadres are requirements for the plan's success. However, these conditions have not been confirmed by official Arab sources and are in fact Israeli demands backed by the U.S. There is an apparent attempt at a trade-off, allowing reconstruction without displacement in exchange for the resistance's leadership. Imparting importance to the Arab plan is U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio's statement that Washington is awaiting the Arab proposal while stressing the need to sideline Hamas.

In a strong response to these reports, senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan stated that his movement would treat any party acting as an occupying force the same way it has treated the Israeli occupation. His remarks reflect a sense of tension and threat. He insisted that the 'day after' in Gaza was and remains a matter for Palestinians alone to decide, strongly rejecting the exclusion of Hamas. He argued that no Hamas leader has been spared the loss of half their families, and therefore, the resistance will not accept being told to step aside, and the resistance's weapons, leadership, and relationships with foreign backers are not up for discussion.

Yes, no one has the right to exclude Hamas, but all Palestinians must prioritize saving Gaza and doing everything possible to prevent the resumption of the genocidal war. This can be achieved by agreeing on a plan that is not only based on rights but also grounded in wisdom. This would require national consensus on Hamas taking two steps back, by not participating in the government but coordinating on its formation, while the PA takes two steps forward to take the reins in Gaza without imposing impossible conditions and without ignoring Hamas' strong presence and the need for this presence to prevent a vacuum that opens the door to chaos, lawlessness, and infighting.

This means that the Arab summit must act differently from previous summits because this time around, it is not only the Palestinian cause on the chopping block but also Arab national security. This summit faces a moment of truth, with three possible options before it, each with its own costs and consequences.

If the summit chooses to challenge and confront the Trump administration, it will face various U.S. sanctions. However, it will gain the support of its people and secure a prominent regional and global role. This could be done by enforcing unity on the Palestinians instead of excluding them and giving priority to providing the means of resilience and survival for the people of Gaza by focusing on preventing the resumption of the war. It would also require establishing a reconstruction fund and launching relief, recovery, and rebuilding efforts, because the way to prevent displacement and curb all forms of migration is through rapid reconstruction backed by an Arab stance willing to leverage political, economic, and diplomatic trump cards and pressure. Such trump cards include freezing and severing ties with Israel and halting any further normalization if it continues its aggression, annexation, and displacement, which would not be limited to Gaza but would extend to the West Bank. Oil, markets, and investments can also be used as bargaining tools.

This means taking a stand that could either lead to conflict or make Trump retreat from his threats of displacement and Gaza's takeover. After all, he is a pragmatic figure rather than an ideologue, and he believes in striking profitable deals. If he sees that the Gaza displacement plan would be a losing deal, he would abandon it to avoid instability and potential conflicts.

If the Arab summit chooses to adapt and establish the 'Trump Reconstruction Fund' in exchange for serving up the resistance's head, it will lose itself and the trust of its people. Its legitimacy will erode, its stability may be shaken, and its dependence on the colonialist West will increase. This will embolden Trump to make additional demands regarding the Palestinian cause or push for increased Arab investments and purchases in the U.S. market, especially in arms deals. 

A third option exists that avoids both full confrontation and adaptation: The option of dissent that allows for a combination of confrontation and concession but without recklessness, betrayal, or surrender. It involves the resistance taking two steps back but maintaining its presence, because abandoning the resistance and its weapons would weaken the Arab position and pave the way for unacceptable submission. This could only be conceivable if the reason for resistance – the Israeli occupation – were to disappear. If the occupation is defeated and an independent Palestinian state is established with Jerusalem as its capital, then the resistance's military wings can be integrated into a unified national army. Until then, the most the resistance can offer is non-participation in the government and agreeing to a long-term truce. The biggest mistake the Arab plan can make would be failing to link the end of war and reconstruction with the launch of a serious political process that starts but does not end with the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The greatest dilemma is that the existential threats facing the Palestinian cause, land, and people have not driven the Palestinian leadership and factions toward unity. Nor have they resulted in new, strong enough political and popular movements capable of achieving the fundamental change needed. Furthermore, they have not led to an agreement on a joint plan that builds upon common ground and seeks to thwart the scheme to liquidate the Palestinian cause by defeating genocide, annexation, and displacement.

The continuation of the split at this critical moment opens the door for the return of Arab and international custodianship under Israeli oversight. Some sources indicate that the Riyadh meeting will not include a Palestinian delegation, even though Palestine is the subject of discussion. If this happens, it will signal the deterioration of the Arab stance and serve as one of the bitter consequences of the split, thus marking the start of the erosion of the Palestinians' exclusive representation, the main achievement that the Palestinian national movement has upheld throughout its history. Will the leadership recognize this before it is too late?

Finally, it is unrealistic to expect the Arab summit to choose confrontation with the U.S. administration, as even the genocidal war did not prompt it to take a stance commensurate with the gravity of the situation. There are factors preventing it from confrontation, namely various complex networks of relationships and dependencies, making a radical shift in its position unlikely at this time. However, adaptation is an unacceptable choice, as it would contribute to the liquidation of the Palestinian cause and undermine Arab national security. Therefore, the expected, acceptable, and viable choice is that of dissent, especially given the harbingers of change in the region and the global order, which is heading toward a multipolar system. This would provide a formula that, on one hand, halts aggression and displacement in the West Bank and Gaza while initiating reconstruction, and on the other, excludes Hamas from participating in governance while opening a political horizon centered on ending the occupation and realizing Palestinian independence. However, it is crucial to reach an understanding with Hamas, as it remains a part of the Palestinian political movement and the dominant force on the ground in Gaza.

"If no understanding is reached with Hamas, it has the ability to turn the tables against everyone," concludes Masri.

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