The Palestinian national project is currently experiencing a comprehensive structural impasse, impacting its vision, political agenda, leadership, and institutions. This is occurring amidst an unprecedented crisis that threatens national identity and legitimate representation. Given the absence of instruments for radical change, which has not matured internally, it is imperative to adopt a gradual approach and work within the realm of the possible. This is crucial for rebuilding the national project, the national movement, and the institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), thereby ensuring it genuinely and effectively serves as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian popular

Some argue that the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA) have become antiquated, corrupt, and ineffective, and that their overthrow, whether through elections or popular revolution, is the only solution. While some of the arguments supporting these propositions hold merit, the prevailing realities contradict them. Elections are not feasible amidst the ongoing genocide, under occupation, and in the context of internal division. The occupation is a primary actor, influencing the conduct or prevention of elections and confiscating results if they do not align with its interests. Furthermore, any contemplation of popular revolution, which lacks the necessary tools and supportive environment, would be met with repression from either the occupation, the PA, or both. Consequently, national consensus and comprehensive, gradual reform emerge as the only realistic option, despite its inherent difficulties and its failure to fully address genuine needs. Nevertheless, this path minimizes losses and damages, salvaging what can be saved. Failure to embark on this course increases the likelihood of further erosion (and collapse) of the political system's institutions across all its components, without the availability of superior alternatives; indeed, the path remains open to even worse outcomes. The option of consensus and reform necessitates a profound diagnosis of the Palestinian, Arab, and international realities. This diagnosis indicates that while the Palestinian cause remains vibrant and present, it confronts existential and fateful challenges, particularly given the increased prominence of external factors in determining the fate of the cause and its representatives. Only national consensus, founded on national and democratic principles and political partnership based on common denominators, can limit the influence of external factors. History, as we know, is replete with examples where adversaries, and even enemies, united to confront common foes.

The viable Palestinian solution rests on a democratic national consensus, grounded in national rights affirmed by international law, and the reassertion of a unified national program.

The reality of Palestinian division perpetuates stagnation. The Palestinian leadership gambles on regaining Gaza under the terms of the Oslo Accords and its unjust commitments, asserting that it will not return to Gaza on the back of Israeli tanks and that it will only return if a legitimate Palestinian umbrella is provided for the resistance and specifically for Hamas, despite successive Israeli governments having long abandoned Oslo and, consequently, the Authority it spawned. Meanwhile, Hamas relies on perseverance for its survival and on making concessions in truce negotiations, as evidenced by discussions of a long-term truce that could extend to ten years or more, and its willingness to cede government control in exchange for retaining power and managing Gaza Strip through a community committee of independent figures under regional and international patronage and support.

The possible solution, therefore, hinges on a democratic national consensus, grounded in national rights affirmed by international law and international legitimacy resolutions. This includes: reasserting the unified national program, which encompasses ending the occupation, the right of return, and self-determination for all the Palestinian people, including (and which should focus on) their right to establish an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, and formulating new strategies capable of achieving this; organizing forms of resistance under the decision of a unified national leadership, based on a national strategy, alongside reaching a long-term mutual truce (as proposed by the resistance in negotiations), imposed by the current conditions following the genocide, destruction, and displacement, and conditioned on pursuing a serious political horizon and developing a popular, political, legal, economic, and media resistance plan; unifying the authority and institutions in the West Bank and Gaza, including security apparatuses and weaponry, under one legitimate leadership. This ensures the exclusivity and regulation of weapon use, as disarming an occupied people is unacceptable, as it undermines a fundamental right and emboldens the occupation to pursue its objectives more rapidly and with fewer costs. This is based on the Palestinian Prisoners' Document for National Accord, which called for the formation of a unified national resistance front that alone decides on resistance and negotiations.

Disarming an occupied people undermines a fundamental right, allowing the occupation to achieve its objectives more rapidly and with fewer costs.

The possible solution also includes forming a national consensus government of independent competencies, whose authority is derived from a unified PLO. This government would seek to unify the two authorities in the West Bank and Gaza into a single authority, while considering the specific circumstances of each region, address the consequences of the division, and prepare for elections at all levels. Factions could contest elections under their old names or by forming new political parties (similar to experiences in many other countries), including Hamas, which formed the Islamic Salvation Party shortly after the establishment of the PA; activating and expanding the temporary leadership framework of the PLO and regularizing its meetings, until a new National Council is formed primarily through elections where feasible, and through consensus where elections are not possible, based on agreed-upon national and objective criteria to ensure the representation of all Palestinians; strengthening the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and their presence on their homeland, especially in the afflicted and displaced areas, and those threatened by displacement, confiscation, Judaization, and settlement.

This scenario may seem distant, but it envisions a single leadership, a single program, a single authority, a single armed force, and an organization that embodies pluralism by including all shades of the political and social spectrum. This scenario is less costly and more realistic than alternatives such as the unification and return of the Authority to Gaza, which would require (assuming the occupation would agree) full compliance with Israeli conditions, or the scenario of Hamas's direct or indirect retention of power, the continuation and deepening of the division, the perpetuation of the current situation with its ongoing genocide, or a return to direct occupation, or the liquidation of the Palestinian cause through destruction, extermination, displacement, and annexation. Do we possess the awareness and the will to embark on this path? The coming days will provide the answer.