Several days, several weeks, or several months.

Scenario One: The conflict endures for a few days, followed by a resumption of negotiations concerning the Iranian nuclear program. The expectation is that the war's outcomes and repercussions will influence the negotiating table. In this scenario, Israel might adopt a more rational and less impulsive stance, having achieved significant objectives. It would then retract its repeated threats of war, opting instead to leverage its military and political gains in negotiations, either directly or through its allies. This scenario is plausible but unlikely, as Tehran is improbable to cease hostilities before achieving a degree of equilibrium, and the leadership in Tel Aviv continues to gamble on victory despite mounting losses.

Scenario Two: The war persists for two or three weeks, potentially longer, as each party endeavors to achieve its major objectives. Israel, for its part, seeks to dismantle Iran's nuclear and missile programs, and, if feasible, aims for regime change. Concurrently, it attempts to draw the United States and NATO nations into the conflict to secure a decisive victory.

Conversely, Iran focuses on resilience, continuing to launch missile strikes against Israel with the aim of military and psychological attrition. This strategy is designed to restore its credibility and deterrent capability, ultimately achieving a balance of power that would allow it to return to the negotiating table from a position of greater strength. The objective would be to secure an agreement that permits uranium enrichment and safeguards its missile program. This scenario is highly probable, given that neither belligerent favors a prolonged conflict, and, crucially, Washington and its allies are against a prolonged war that threatens their influence and gains.

Scenario Three: This scenario, while plausible, is less likely and involves the war extending for several months or more. This outcome would, relatively speaking, serve Iran's interests if the hostilities continue at their current pace or slightly higher, without escalating into a comprehensive war involving Washington and transgressing the red lines that both parties remain keen to avoid.

Iran possesses a strategic advantage: its landmass is 74 times larger than Israel's, and its population is eight times greater. Furthermore, it boasts extensive experience in resilience, stemming from the triumph of the Iranian Revolution, enduring over 3,500 sanctions, and surviving the protracted war with Iraq.

While Israel has demonstrated resilience in its conflict with Gaza, its capacity to withstand a prolonged war with Iran remains questionable, particularly in light of the direct and unprecedented targeting of the Israeli home front and the escalating daily losses across human, military, economic, and morale dimensions.

Israel, as the aggressor, perceives salvation in the United States' offensive involvement, mirroring its defensive and military support, and its participation in deception through Trump's feigned disapproval of initiating the war, despite his awareness that the decision had already been made.

Israel's dilemma lies in Washington's apparent lack of enthusiasm for offensive participation, preferring a return to negotiations. This preference stems from a desire to capitalize on the significant strike Israel delivered at the outset of the war.

The United States is wary of being drawn into a costly war, both in terms of human lives and economic resources, at a time when American public opinion, and even broad segments of the Republican Party, oppose such a conflict. Numerous leaders and influential figures have publicly articulated this stance.

Moreover, the war carries grave economic and security implications, potentially opening the door to a regional, and perhaps global, conflict. This is especially true given the possibility of closing the Strait of Hormuz and halting Iranian oil exports, which would inflict severe damage on several nations, most notably China.

Among the alarming indicators for Israel is the emergence of what could be termed a 'black swan scenario': Pakistan's unexpected stance. Islamabad officially declared its support for Iran, with the Pakistani Army Chief of Staff even threatening a nuclear response if Iran were to be threatened with nuclear weapons – a sentiment echoed by the North Korean leader.

Furthermore, Israeli and Russian sources have reported that both China and Russia, along with Pakistan, have provided military support to Iran, including missiles and air defense systems. This development anticipates the potential formation of an anti-Israeli international alliance, which might not merely condemn Israeli aggression or support Iran's right to retaliate, but could also establish a 'red line' to prevent Iran's defeat.