The Election Decree and the Palestinian Predicament: Between the Need for Reform and the Risks of Exclusion
By: Hani Al Masri
In a move that was not without surprise, President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree on Saturday, July 19, 2025, calling for elections for the Palestinian National Council (PNC) to be held before the end of the year, with no mention of presidential or legislative elections.
The strangeness of the decree lies in its deviation from the content of the letter recently sent by the President on June 9th to both the French President and the Saudi Crown Prince. That letter included a series of commitments related to the salaries of prisoners and their transformation into a social rather than a struggle-related issue, educational curricula, halting alleged incitement, disarming Hamas and removing it from power, and seeking the assistance of Arab and foreign forces. Furthermore, it included a commitment to hold presidential and legislative elections within a year, in which only those who accept the program and commitments of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and believe in a single authority and a single weapon would participate.
At first glance, it may seem that there is no difference between calling for PNC elections and calling for presidential and legislative elections. However, the difference is fundamental in terms of priorities. Is the priority for the PLO or the Palestinian Authority (PA), or is it an approach that includes both the PLO and the PA simultaneously and in parallel? It also relates to whether unity is a gateway to elections, which would ensure competition within a unified framework and acceptance of all parties by others, or if elections are a gateway to unity. The "elections first" approach is a recipe for using them as a tool for decisiveness and excluding others, rather than uniting them in the face of the occupation and its plans. Unity can only be achieved on the basis of a common national program for a simple but crucial reason: Palestine is under occupation and is going through a phase of national liberation that requires a national front to achieve that liberation.
Before this decree was issued, it was implicitly understood that members of the Legislative Council were automatically members of the National Council, meaning they represented the "inside" (the West Bank and Gaza), with parallel representation for Palestinians abroad. The formation of the Council would then be completed according to criteria that ensure the representation of various sectors and factions, including those that do not pass the electoral threshold, alongside independent national figures. The national agreement, expressed in a decision by the PNC at its 23rd session in 2018, was that the "inside" would be represented by 150 members and the "outside" by 200 members.
However, according to the current decree, two-thirds of the PNC members, which will consist of 350 members, will be from the "inside," while the remaining one-third will represent the "outside" and the diaspora, even though the Palestinian people are almost evenly divided between the "inside" and the "outside." This reflects impulsiveness and frivolity, without justification or explanation.
Potential Scenarios:
Scenario One: The Decree as a Political Manoeuvre
This scenario suggests that the decree is not serious but is part of political manoeuvring aimed at buying time, distracting the Palestinians and those concerned with their cause, and reminding everyone of the PLO's existence and the need to involve it in post-"war" arrangements, especially after its continuous marginalization by regional and international powers. The PLO itself has contributed to its own marginalization through a policy of self-distancing, waiting, and adapting to the facts on the ground created by the occupation, under the survival strategy it has adopted since before and after October 7th. This scenario is reinforced by the weakness of the Palestinian leadership and the lack of genuine will to face challenges, foremost among them the Israeli position that rejects any role for the PA or the PLO. It also reflects the absence of a cohesive opposition that presents a new vision and strategies capable of achieving victory.
The intention, therefore, would be to declare the intention to hold elections and then use obstacles as an excuse. This means there is no real intention to hold the elections, and later, obstacles will be cited, whether Israeli (especially in Jerusalem and Gaza with the continuation of the "war" and its repercussions) or internal (such as Hamas preventing them or refusing to participate, as it is expected to remain an active player in the Strip to some extent according to the "war's" results), leading to another postponement of the elections.
Scenario Two: Citing Obstacles and Forming the Council by Appointment
This scenario involves "overcoming" the obstacles by forming the new National Council by appointment, as was done in the past (with the difference that the PLO, during its ascendant phase, enjoyed legitimacy derived from the national program, resistance, and consensus among various forces). This would involve including representatives from unions and syndicates under the pretext that they are elected, as a "temporary solution" until conditions are suitable for holding elections. Although this scenario is possible, it is currently unlikely.
Scenario Three: Stirring Stagnant Waters Towards National Consensus
This is a weak scenario in the foreseeable future, but its analysis is necessary for scientific and objective purposes. This scenario assumes that the decree will stir the stagnant waters and pave the way for a national consensus that includes the formation of a government of technocrats and the implementation of the remaining components of the Beijing Declaration or a community support committee. In both cases, a national authority represented by the PLO in the form of a temporary leadership framework would be available until elections are held. A support committee or a government would be responsible for preparing for free and fair elections within the context of a comprehensive reform of the PLO's institutions. Of course, forming a national consensus government would be better as it would be more capable and legitimate.
Reasons for Objecting to the Decree
First, the decree was issued unilaterally without any national consultation, which weakens its legitimacy and deprives it of the necessary political cover to be considered a serious step forward. This is especially true given that the legitimacy of the President and various institutions in the PA and the PLO has eroded due to the failure to hold elections for several cycles, coupled with the failure of the Oslo Accords and the negotiation option, and the inability of the resistance to achieve liberation or progress towards it.
Second, the decree ignored urgent national priorities, foremost among them stopping the genocide and displacement, reconstruction, confronting annexation and liquidation plans, and providing the elements of steadfastness and survival for the cause and the people. It also ignored the need to form a unified national leadership and formulate a comprehensive Palestinian strategy to face existential challenges and risks and to capitalize on available opportunities.
It is incomprehensible how elections can be held in Gaza under bombardment, destruction, massacres, siege, starvation, and thirst, or in the West Bank amidst a policy of creeping annexation, settlement expansion, fragmentation, arrests, settler attacks, and the dismantling of the foundations of national existence to the point that even the PA is being undermined because it embodies the national identity and keeps the door open for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Even if a truce deal is reached, there is no guarantee that it will lead to a permanent ceasefire or a real Israeli withdrawal. The occupation will continue its aggression, maintain security control, and seek to replicate the model of the West Bank and Lebanon after the ceasefire agreement.
Another major drawback is the decree's condition that participants must commit to the PLO's program, its obligations, and international legitimacy, in a clear violation of the essence of the democratic process, which is based on competition between multiple forces and programs within a unified national framework. What is required is not to impose a political program on others—as programs, alliances, and policies change with circumstances—but rather to agree on a binding and comprehensive national charter that serves as a constitution until a constitution for the state of Palestine is drafted. This charter should be based on the unity of the land, people, cause, and narrative, derive its legitimacy from the national heritage and fundamental rights, and be formulated in a universal legal, political, and humanitarian language. It should envision the best and maximum that can be achieved without compromising the national cause and fundamental rights. The current National Charter, which was emptied of its content by the initiation of an amendment process that was never completed, should be reconsidered.
The way out exists: to implement what was previously agreed upon by national consensus, which is to adopt the amended Basic Law, the Declaration of Independence, and the PLO's Basic Law when holding elections, without additions that would prevent the participation of key factions.
Conclusion:
The reference to PNC elections while ignoring presidential and legislative elections could be interpreted as giving priority to the PLO and intending to favour the state over the authority. This in itself is a positive thing, because the authority is governed by an unjust and unfair agreement and restrictions, whereas the state embodies the right to self-determination and international law and UN resolutions; it is a non-negotiable right, and negotiations should be about its implementation, not its existence. If the decree had come in this context and as part of a comprehensive review aimed at rebuilding the PLO and activating its institutions on democratic foundations, opening it up to all forces and currents that believe in partnership, far from exclusion, accusations of treason, and monopoly, then it would be welcome. However, if this step turns into a means to exclude those who do not agree with the official program that has long reached a dead end, or to reproduce the old formula that relied on appointments based on a factional quota system, it will only deepen the Palestinian predicament.
