Paper Abstract

This is the summary of the paper I presented at the dialogue workshop organized by the Yasser Arafat Foundation and the Public Policy Institute on "National Unity between Aspiration and Application: Towards Embodying the Unified Representation and Strengthening the National Front." My intervention focused on providing a critical review of the national reconciliation dialogues and agreements, and why they have not succeeded so far.

Until 2005, Hamas, as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, sought to establish an alternative or parallel framework to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). At this stage, it bears a greater responsibility than the official leadership and Fatah for the failure to achieve national unity, as it maintained its existence outside the Palestinian political system.

Subsequently, Hamas adopted a policy of engaging in the Palestinian political system, seeking to enter the PLO, the Authority, and the conflict from within. It was allowed to participate in local and legislative elections, but the door to the Authority was opened to it while the door to the PLO was closed, especially after its surprising victory in the 2006 elections. President Mahmoud Abbas tasked Ismail Haniyeh with forming the government, but attempts were made to thwart his government, making the official leadership and Fatah responsible for the failure to achieve unity at that stage. Then came the crime of the 2007 coup, carried out by Hamas in Gaza after the failure of the national unity government experiment. This was a gravely serious event, noting that the Authority did not actually empower it to govern despite it forming the tenth government alone.

Although external parties, led by the occupying state and various regional axes, played a fundamental role in the emergence and continuation of the division, there are internal factors for which the Palestinians are responsible, and addressing them must begin with them.

The official leadership placed gradual and difficult conditions for Hamas's accession to the PLO, culminating in the "eight points" proposed by President Mahmoud Abbas, the most prominent of which was commitment to the PLO's program and its obligations. This was an impossible condition, especially since Israeli governments had killed the Oslo Accords and begun a plan to liquidate the Palestinian cause. This was despite Hamas having expressed on more than one occasion its readiness to respect these obligations without explicitly committing to them. It also agreed to delegate negotiations to the PLO and the President, betting on the failure of this path, and also agreed to truces and popular resistance.

Hamas sought a reconciliation based on a bilateral power-sharing arrangement with Fatah, without touching the essence of its unilateral control over governance in Gaza. Meanwhile, the Authority and Fatah viewed reconciliation as a gateway to regaining Gaza, without any real partnership for Hamas in the Authority or the PLO.

Since the issuance of Hamas's political document in 2017 and the election of a new leadership, the movement has shown a willingness to relinquish power in Gaza in exchange for a partnership in the PLO and the Authority, but the official leadership did not respond to this. Hamas's desire for unity was clearly demonstrated in the Rajoub-Arouri understandings, which stipulated running in elections on a joint list in which Fatah would be granted 51% of the seats, and nominating Mahmoud Abbas for the presidency as a consensus candidate. However, these understandings were thwarted by internal opposition in both Fatah and Hamas, and more importantly, by the refusal of the occupation, Arab and regional countries, and the United States.

The cancellation of the 2021 elections was a grave mistake; had they been held, things would not have reached the state they are in today.

Achieving national unity requires a deep awareness of its importance, a political will capable of paying its price, and first and foremost, internal Palestinian popular legitimacy derived from elections or from a broad, comprehensive national consensus, especially if holding elections is not possible. It also needs Arab and international legitimacy and cover, which would grant it the ability to endure, continue, and operate.

However, unity will not be achieved unless there is first an agreement on a national program for the current stage and its implementation mechanisms, one that is suitable for addressing challenges and risks and capable of capitalizing on available opportunities. This must be alongside consensus on the foundations and rules of partnership and joint front action under the reality of occupation and the stage of national liberation.

Based on this, national unity remains unattainable in the absence of fundamental changes in the map of Palestinian political power balances, and the absence of a favourable Arab, regional, and international environment.