After a partial deal on Gaza seemed within reach, and the gaps in disagreement over withdrawal maps, prisoner exchanges, humanitarian aid, and guarantees had narrowed, the American envoy Steve Witkoff, after meeting with the minister closest to Benjamin Netanyahu, Ron Dermer, suddenly blew up the situation, claiming that "Hamas thwarted the negotiations," and hinted at the existence of "other options." Then, the idea of shifting from a partial to a comprehensive deal began to be promoted, under the threat: either Hamas agrees to the proposed conditions, or the suffocating siege on the areas not yet occupied will be tightened, and perhaps they will be occupied, despite the opposition of the Israeli army, which understands that any new invasion will take a long time to achieve its set objectives, and that it needs a significant reinforcement of forces operating in the Strip, at a time when the occupation army is exhausted, and its assessment is that the war has exhausted its purposes, and an invasion would expose the lives of Israeli prisoners to severe danger, inflict heavy losses on the occupying forces, and could ultimately lead to getting bogged down in a long war of attrition, occupying the Strip, and imposing direct military rule over it, which would exacerbate the isolation and anger against the occupying state, and increase the chances of serious sanctions being imposed on it.

There is a collective Palestinian way out that has not been taken, which is achieved by the official leadership providing a way out for "Hamas," allowing its participation in the political system.

To understand the secret of the major shift that has occurred over the past two weeks, we see that the world was horrified and preoccupied with the reality of what is happening in the Strip: a war of genocide and systematic starvation that has led to the death of hundreds of civilians from hunger, and threatens the lives of hundreds of thousands in a war that now uses hunger as a tool of pressure to achieve what the military war, genocide, and displacement failed to do. The plans to build the "inhuman city" in the south of the Strip, or other "inhuman and safe zones," were nothing but an expression of a hidden intention to impose forced displacement as one of the war's objectives, an objective whose proposal (like that of annexation) is not merely a tactical manoeuvre aimed at changing the position of "Hamas" and the rest of the resistance factions. Just as Israel denied the 1948 Nakba, it today denies the Nakba of starvation and famine that has turned the aid distribution centers, established by the "Gaza Inhumanitarian Organization," into death traps. Thousands of civilians were forced to crowd and get food in just eight minutes, distributed among four distribution centers, which, as of this writing, has led to the martyrdom of more than 1,300 people and the injury of about seven thousand others.

Although the indicators pointed to Netanyahu's desire to complete the deal, and his fear of it at the same time, especially to please Donald Trump who was pushing for the deal to be concluded, and to gain electoral points after the Iranian-Israeli war, portraying it as having dealt devastating blows to Iran, this later showed its true colors, as evidenced by the fact that Israel also received unprecedentedly strong blows, and that the Iranian regime is steadfast in its previous positions, and the demands from it are still on the table, and because the internal Israeli opposition to the continuation of the war is increasing, including the Haredim's refusal to be drafted, the growing phenomenon of refusing military service, the army's human losses, the continuation and increase of suicides among soldiers who participated in the war, and the military establishment's bias towards the option of a partial deal. This is on the one hand, and on the other hand, the complex political calculations after the war of starvation have led to Israel's image in the world being at rock bottom, even among its closest allies, with the increasing use of terms like "genocide," "apartheid," and "famine" to describe its actions. This scene, in addition to the "tsunami" of recognition of the Palestinian state, which included major countries: France, Canada, and Britain, constituted a political shock to the far-right government in Israel, and made Netanyahu back down from his intention to resort to early elections for fear of losing them, which made him need his government to continue longer than he thought after the "victory" over Iran, and he began to bet on escalating the war, because a partial deal could lead to a ceasefire with "Hamas" still in existence, and this is considered a defeat that will lead him to a certain loss in the elections, and a difficult accountability from the commission of inquiry that will investigate the historic failure of "October 7" (2023), and the even greater failure of not completing the achievement of the objectives and stopping the war, despite the passage of nearly 22 months since its outbreak, so he seeks a partial deal on his terms or an escalation of the war after trying to break the intensity of international criticism by allowing a certain amount of humanitarian aid.

There is an Israeli bet, approved by the Americans, on the collapse and surrender of the resistance, due to popular and political pressures, or the possibility of freeing the prisoners by force.

From the point of view of Netanyahu and his government, the world seems to be "rewarding Hamas" and the Palestinians by recognizing a Palestinian state, despite all the unjust conditions imposed on the Palestinians, including the call to disarm and remove "Hamas" from power, which was included in the New York Declaration, while no conditions are imposed on Israel, the state that violates international law, has committed all kinds of crimes, and includes ministers who propose ideas of genocide, displacement, and annexation of others' land. From Washington's side, the American position has witnessed a shift, as quoted from an Egyptian official, who said that Washington is less involved in pressuring Israel to stop the war, the tone of American officials has changed, and they have begun to focus on demanding the surrender of "Hamas," and reject negotiations that lead to a temporary ceasefire, while promoting a comprehensive deal that does not include an Israeli withdrawal, nor does it guarantee an end to the genocide, annexation, and displacement, but rather includes impossible conditions, such as giving "Hamas" a deadline to release the Israeli prisoners immediately and without compensation, disarming "Hamas" and removing it from the political scene, and handing over power to the United States without the Palestinian Authority or the Community Support Committee. This is a proposal that does not open the way for negotiations, but is a recipe for surrender, not for a settlement, and it is a proposal whose chances of success, if not substantially modified, are not great, but will be met with opposition even from Arab countries, Turkey, Canada, and Europe, who support the return of a renewed Authority to the Gaza Strip, so that what they have pledged to establish a Palestinian state can be implemented.

This shift also came against the backdrop of the decline in popularity of Trump and his party as a result of the Gaza war, and other reasons, and his involvement in the Epstein scandal which is being used to pressure him, to reduce any potential influence he may have on the Israeli position. Is military escalation the only scenario?... No, as many of the factors that pushed towards a partial deal still exist, the most important of which is that the gap between the two positions is small, as evidenced by the talk of Washington and Israel giving "Hamas" a deadline, albeit a short one, as military escalation does not have a magic wand, whether it takes the form of a tighter siege, the occupation of new sites, or the occupation of the remaining unoccupied land. There is a real race between three paths: a partial deal that remains on the table despite its current distance from the negotiating table, a comprehensive deal that seems far-fetched if not modified, and may be used as a tactic to pressure "Hamas" to make new concessions, because the gap between the two positions regarding the comprehensive deal is very wide, and there is also an Israeli bet, approved by the Americans, on the collapse and surrender of the resistance, due to Palestinian and Arab popular and political pressures, or the possibility of freeing the prisoners by force without negotiation.

Hamas's options seem limited. It practically agreed to Witkoff's proposal, and some issues remained that could be agreed upon, but it was surprised by the collapse of the negotiations when the agreement was close to completion. If it finally agrees to the new Israeli-American conditions, it will appear as if it has surrendered and declared its defeat, and if it refuses, it will be held responsible for the upcoming escalation.

Hamas will not surrender, because surrender does not guarantee a halt to the war that targets not only it, but also the liquidation of the Palestinian cause.

There is a collective Palestinian way out that has not been taken, which is achieved by the official leadership providing a way out for "Hamas," allowing its participation in the political system, and in return, the Hamas movement shows more flexibility, so there becomes one Palestinian leadership and one institution, based first on Palestinian legitimacy, and second on Arab and international legitimacy. "Hamas" has made great concessions, including agreeing to the partial deal even though it believes the war will resume after the 60-day truce ends, and coming close to agreeing to maps that would keep occupying forces on more than 20% of the Strip's area, with the remaining dispute being over tens or hundreds of meters, and over the release of 200 prisoners in exchange for ten Israelis, even though it previously released 500 for the same number. It also accepted handing over governance to the Community Support Committee as soon as the 60-day truce began, and was satisfied with American guarantees for this truce, without insisting on guarantees that would prevent the resumption of the war, and it cannot offer more, because it will not surrender, especially since surrender does not guarantee a halt to the war that targets not only "Hamas," but also the liquidation of the Palestinian cause in all its components, including displacement and annexation, and surrender is not guaranteed to stop the war, and could whet the appetite of the occupying state to continue implementing its declared and undeclared objectives.

Stopping the genocide must be the top priority because it opens the way to stopping displacement and annexation and preserves the existence of the resistance, for without the existence of the people on their land, there is no resistance, and it returns the Palestinian issue to its correct path: ending the occupation and embodying freedom and independence. This requires building on the international movement supporting the recognition of the Palestinian state, despite the unjust conditions it contains, and working to form a unified national leadership, a single political program, and a single weapon that performs its duty in defending the homeland and the citizen, and serves and commits to the national strategy and the decisions of the unified legitimate national institutions.