Beyond all predictions,
Netanyahu agreed to Trump's plan after introducing substantial amendments to align it with Israeli conditions. The most prominent of these was Trump's understanding of opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state, acceptance of the return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza strip, but only after major reforms determined by Israel or a 'Peace Council’. Additionally, the plan does not stipulate actual withdrawal but instead suggests a gradual withdrawal with no set timeline, meaning Israeli security control would remain in place indefinitely, until Israel ensures that there is no threat to its security.
The plan also called for international guardianship over the Palestinians and deepening the division between the West Bank and Gaza through a 'Peace Council' headed by Trump and criminal "Prime Minister" Tony Blair, with no specified term.
The only clear, binding, and immediate component of the plan is the release of Israeli prisoners within 72 hours and the provision of humanitarian aid. The rest of the clauses are vague and require negotiation, with no timelines or guarantees—serving the Israeli position.
The first breach of the plan came from Trump himself, who stated that if Hamas delayed or rejected the plan, he would give Netanyahu the green light to 'complete the mission’, despite the text of the plan stating that its implementation is limited to areas not under Hamas control.
One of the important points included in the plan is halting the war and the failure of the displacement project. However, it’s notable that neither Trump nor the plan mentioned rejecting the annexation of the West Bank, as he had done in the past.
The Palestinian response to the plan must be collective, as it targets the entire Palestinian people with all its components and living forces. Nevertheless, a dilemma persists across all options: whether to accept or reject the plan. A third option remains—conditional acceptance and demanding its amendment.
Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire
As the second anniversary of October 7 approaches, Palestinian political analyst Hani Al-Masri warns that the war of annihilation, starvation, displacement, and annexation is entering its second year with no clear resolution in sight. In his latest assessment, Al-Masri lays out competing scenarios for Gaza, the Palestinian cause, and the region at large, pointing to a grim contest between the bad and the worse scenarios, while admitting that chances for a good one remain exceedingly slim.
“The “Bad” Scenario: Conflict Management Without Resolution”
According to Al-Masri, this outcome would see the war halted, a prisoner exchange carried out, and Israeli forces withdrawing within months. Humanitarian relief and reconstruction would follow, under Arab and international funding but with American oversight.
This scenario also entails Hamas leaving power, disarming the resistance, and the formation of a transitional authority managed directly by the United States. Such an arrangement, Al-Masri cautions, risks deepening the division between Gaza and the West Bank, reducing the Palestinian Authority’s role in Gaza to a symbolic one. Even proposals that someone like Tony Blair could lead such an authority, he notes, border on the absurd, given Blair’s record in Palestine, Iraq, and the wider Arab world.
Arab forces may also be deployed for a transitional period, effectively placing Gaza under a joint international-Arab-American-Israeli trusteeship, justified under the pretext of “ensuring Israel’s security.” Meanwhile, settlement expansion, land confiscation, and the creeping annexation of the West Bank would continue, alongside spatial and temporal division of Al-Aqsa Mosque.
This “bad” scenario, Al-Masri explains, becomes more likely if Israel’s current far-right government is replaced by one slightly less extreme, enabling the creation of a Palestinian entity larger than autonomy but still falling short of statehood, with fragmented, cosmetic sovereignty in Gaza and the West Bank.
He links this possibility to ideas floated by Donald Trump during meetings with the Arab-Islamic delegation in New York, which blended with the Arab plan into what is now being promoted as a so-called “transitional solution.”
“The “Worse” Scenario: Comprehensive Liquidation”
The darkest outcome, in Al-Masri’s reading, is the continuation of genocide and forced displacement, leading to mass expulsion abroad, the re-colonization of Gaza, and its transformation into a “Middle East Riviera.”
It would also involve annexing the West Bank, dismantling the Palestinian Authority into little more than fragmented municipal bodies, and reducing Palestinians to “residents” stripped of political rights and sovereignty.
This would mark nothing less than the liquidation of the Palestinian cause in its entirety.
“The “Good” Scenario: National Reconciliation”
Though slim, Al-Masri insists a positive path remains possible. This would require halting the war, securing an Israeli withdrawal, releasing prisoners, and launching urgent humanitarian aid.
A national unity government with independent Palestinian legitimacy would then rebuild the Palestine Liberation Organization to include all political and social currents, hold elections swiftly, or agree on a shared governance framework with checks and balances. The basis would be a realistic national struggle program aimed at ending the occupation and securing independence.
But Al-Masri concedes that deep division, a weakened PLO, and Hamas’s preoccupation with war and negotiations make such unity elusive. Without a comprehensive vision and plan that can impose itself—or serve as a credible alternative to the official leadership’s choices—this scenario remains out of reach.
In in the antepenultimate section, we come to see where the scales tip, as Al-Masri judges the “bad” scenario as the most probable. It suits Washington and Tel Aviv’s need to escape a war that has failed to achieve its grand objectives—annihilation, mass displacement, annexation, settlement, and regional dominance—while avoiding further destabilizing the region or undermining U.S. plans for expanding the Abraham Accords.
The “worse” scenario, he warns, derives strength from Israel’s extremist government, unconditional U.S. backing, and the Trump administration’s obsession with freeing Israeli captives—possibly even giving Netanyahu the green light to resume war once they are released.
The “good” scenario, meanwhile, is obstructed by Palestinian disunity and exclusionary conditions placed on participation, leaving it dependent on a political will that is currently absent.
In the section titled “Lessons and Takeaways”, Al-Masri underscores a central truth: power has limits. Israel, which believed it had buried the possibility of a Palestinian state, now faces a reality where that outcome may be closer than ever, if Palestinians can craft a unified vision and leadership capable of leveraging global shifts and mounting solidarity.
For Al-Masri, independence requires not recycled negotiations but real pressure that makes Israel’s occupation costlier than its continuation.
Almasri Concludes, the “bad” scenario may be the most available option now, but it must not be the final word. Arab, Islamic, and friendly nations should heed their peoples’ calls not only to halt the war and occupation but also to assist Palestinians in transforming this moment into a transition—one that allows them to regroup, learn, and advance toward a realistic, struggle-based national project.
As the Netanyahu–Trump meeting draws near, AlMasri highlights that the next chapter will be written: will it turn toward closing the gates of annihilation, or open them wider—a desperate sprint between calamity and catastrophe?
