In a recent analysis, Hani Al-Masri, political analyst, columnist, and Managing Director of Masarat Center, maintains that four months after the ceasefire, “the war of genocide and total destruction in Gaza has stopped, but the aggression has not.” What has followed, he argues, is “another war, slower in pace and largely one-sided,” which has resulted in the killing of around 600 Palestinians, the wounding of more than 1,500 others, the destruction of thousands of homes and facilities, the expansion of the so-called “buffer zone,” and a further reduction of Gaza’s already shrinking livable space.
Al-Masri notes that the Rafah crossing “was only opened days ago, despite being scheduled to open in the first phase of the agreement,” adding that its opening “is closer to closure than to real access,” due to sharply reduced numbers of travelers, humiliating conditions, and strict Israeli control over the flow of humanitarian aid, relief supplies, recovery materials, and reconstruction inputs. He points out that although a technocratic committee was formed a month ago “by a decision of the U.S. administration and in coordination with Israel,” with its reference authority being the so-called “Trump Council” and its executive office operating under the supervision and leadership of UN envoy Nikolay Mladenov, “it has still not been allowed to enter the Gaza Strip.” For Al-Masri, this sends an unmistakable message: “Israel holds the upper hand, and nothing takes place without its approval.”
According to Al-Masri, even after the handover of the last Israeli body, “nothing changed, on the contrary, the aggression escalated and the number of martyrs increased.” He highlights Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s explicit declaration that Israel will not accept an international stabilization or monitoring force, but instead seeks “a force tasked with disarmament,” while rejecting the participation of Turkish or other forces, rejecting the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, and rejecting the establishment of a Palestinian state “whether in the West Bank and Gaza together, or even in Gaza alone.” The Israeli government, he argues, behaves as though the current realities are permanent, constructing fortifications and military infrastructure and insisting that “Israeli security sovereignty will remain in place until further notice.”
Within this context, Al-Masri writes, Palestinians are being pushed into a coercive equation: “either genocide or apartheid; either direct occupation or the 'Trump Council,’ which provides political cover for occupation.” He argues that the wager on Donald Trump has collapsed and that “there is no remaining option but to rely first on the Palestinian self, second on the global solidarity movement, and then on Arabs and friends.” This, he stresses, must be done with wisdom and realism, focusing on steadfastness and the survival of the people on their land and of their cause, “without submission or surrender, and without recklessness or political suicide.”
From this reality, emerge three major mirages or as AlMasri calls them, illusions that must be abandoned immediately.
The first is the illusion that “an era of prosperity and reconstruction is just around the corner.” This, he argues, is entirely disconnected from reality as long as aggression continues, Israel controls every aspect of life, and reconstruction is weaponized as a political tool, made conditional on disarmament and the perpetuation of Israeli security dominance.
The second illusion is the belief that the Palestinian Authority can return to Gaza “in its current form.” Al-Masri notes that the Authority is itself being steadily undermined in the West Bank, turning into “an authority without authority,” pushed either toward functioning as a service agent for the occupation’s objectives or toward collapse, paving the way for isolated local administrative bodies—mirroring the technocratic committee model proposed for Gaza.
The third illusion, which Al-Masri describes as “the most dangerous,” is the assumption that the de facto authority in Gaza can continue, directly or indirectly. This, he argues, offers Israel, “the apartheid state”—a ready pretext to prolong the current war or to return to a full-scale war of genocide. According to Israel’s post-October 7, 2023 security doctrine, he writes, “there will be no return to the previous status quo—not today, and not tomorrow.” Israel will persist with pre-emptive strikes, buffer zones, direct military presence, and the cultivation of local proxies, and “will not allow the continuation of Hamas rule.”
Al-Masri maintains that the intentions of Netanyahu’s government are clear: preserving the current situation under the banner of disarmament until the groundwork is laid for annexation, decisive control, forced displacement, and the deepening of apartheid—ultimately realizing the project of “Greater Israel.” Israel, he notes, has openly declared its readiness to use force to impose disarmament if “soft” methods fail, without any urgency, because “the continuation of the current situation serves its strategic goals.”
On the American front, Al-Masri observes that there has been “not a single U.S. condemnation of Israeli violations,” only praise for what are described as “achievements” and repeated insistence on Gaza’s disarmament—thereby providing political cover and a green light for continued aggression. More dangerously, he notes, months have passed without the launch of any serious negotiations over weapons, despite the possibility of addressing the issue in the first phase, allowing disarmament to be used as a pretext for ongoing collective punishment and for keeping Gaza “an area unfit for human life.”
Against this backdrop, Al-Masri calls for a new approach to the weapons issue, grounded in maximum flexibility. This approach, he argues, should avoid linking disarmament to a political horizon, Palestinian statehood, or national unity “conditions that are currently unattainable” and should not be tied to factional demands, because “the people’s rights and interests take precedence over the interests of individuals or factions.” He proposes exploring the option of collecting heavy weapons, particularly rockets, and placing them “in the hands of friendly parties under clear arrangements,” while directly linking the regulation of weapons to reconstruction and Israeli withdrawal. “Only serious and rapid reconstruction,” he stresses, “can block the path to displacement.”
At the same time, Al-Masri rejects the surrender of remaining light weapons while assassinations continue and armed client gangs operate with impunity, threatening social cohesion through chaos and lawlessness—unless a credible local security force or a trustworthy international stabilization force is in place.
The aim, he concludes, is to prevent weapons from becoming “a pretext for prolonging the war or returning to genocide,” and to ensure that they do not obstruct reconstruction or the genuine opening of the Rafah crossing. He notes that the resistance itself has expressed readiness to regulate weapons, place them with a friendly party, and agree to a long-term truce—potentially lasting ten years—that would freeze armed resistance in Gaza in light of the catastrophic outcomes and the unbearable price paid by the population.
Al-Masri ends by stressing the urgent need for a serious national debate on forms of struggle and resistance after Al-Aqsa Flood. “The new reality,” he writes, “requires acknowledging that armed struggle is neither the only nor the primary path at this stage,” without relinquishing the right to resistance in all its forms. Resistance, he reminds us, “is broader than weapons,” and the occupation’s true objective is not the confiscation of guns, but “the breaking of the will to resist, the breaking of popular steadfastness, and the breaking of attachment to rights and the struggle to realize them.”
Drawing on past experience, Al-Masri warns that postponing decisive choices under illusions, such as betting on Trump or waiting for a new Israeli government in the hope of improving negotiating conditions, often leads to worse outcomes, not better ones. What is required now, he argues, is minimizing losses, creating the conditions for effective steadfastness, thwarting attempts to liquidate the Palestinian cause, blocking the imposition of guardianship and substitute arrangements, and undertaking serious efforts to reorganize the Palestinian national house. This must be done on the basis of a comprehensive vision of the current reality and its likely trajectories, realistic national and revolutionary policies grounded in shared principles, and gradual national convergence, leading ultimately to genuine partnership, true national unity, and the formation of a unified national leadership capable of preserving the unity of the cause, the land, the people, the narrative, the rights, and the goals.
