According to Mr. Hani Al-Masri, the ongoing conflict is best understood as an “open war… in its objectives, arenas, parties, and timeline.” He notes that the war is approaching its first month, yet “no one knows when it will end.” As he puts it, wars are easy to start but hard to finish, you may know who lights the fuse, but not who can put it out or when.
Al-Masri explains that this is an “open” war because its goals are not fixed. They range “from destroying Iran’s capabilities, to toppling the regime, and even not excluding the collapse and fragmentation of the state.” In his view, these shifting aims are partly shaped by the personality of Donald Trump, whom he describes as someone who “lies as easily as he breathes” and frequently contradicts himself about the war’s purpose and outcomes.
At the same time, Al-Masri highlights a clear divergence between the United States and Israel. Washington’s priority, he argues, is to force Iranian compliance, “through changing leadership or policy, with or without an agreement.” Meanwhile, Israel’s priority is to keep the war going “until the regime falls,” and even to consider fragmenting Iran into smaller entities, reshaping the region in line with its broader ambitions.
He also points out that labeling the conflict as “military operations” instead of a war is no accident, it’s a way to sidestep political and legal constraints. These actions are framed as “preemptive strikes,” supported by two conflicting narratives: one claiming to prevent an imminent Iranian attack, and another suggesting that Israel would have initiated the war regardless.
On regime change, Al-Masri makes it clear that stepping back from this goal does not mean abandoning it. Rather, it reflects the failure of expectations that the Iranian system would collapse quickly. The strategy, he suggests, is now to weaken Iran over time. For its part, Iran demands that any settlement must fully end the war, not just pause it, fearing that a temporary ceasefire could simply reset the clock. Drawing on other conflicts, he notes that ceasefires often stop large-scale violence but allow other forms of pressure to continue.
Geographically, the war is expanding, potentially drawing in more countries and strategic waterways. Al-Masri warns that this raises the risk of a wider international confrontation. Time-wise, the conflict is also open-ended: “it may last weeks, months, or perhaps years,” especially given the instability of the current global order and the ongoing struggle over whether the world remains dominated by one power or shifts toward multiple centers of influence.
He outlines four possible scenarios: continuation as a war of attrition, major escalation involving new actors and critical infrastructure, the use of weapons of mass destruction, or an end to the war with or without agreement. Right now, he sees “a race between escalation and containment, with no decisive outcome.” In the short term, the most likely path is continued attrition, a situation he describes as a “loser–loser equation.” Still, he notes that simply surviving without giving in could be seen as a relative win for Iran.
Al-Masri argues that Washington will be eager to secure a clear and tangible victory to justify ending the war, especially given domestic political pressures on Trump. Without such a win, the administration risks looking weak. Yet he underscores a key point: “military superiority does not lead to political resolution.” Iran, as the defending side, holds certain advantages, greater resilience, stronger motivation, and broader public backing.
As for escalation, he cautions that it comes at a steep price. A ground intervention, for instance, could turn into a quagmire reminiscent of past wars. The use of weapons of mass destruction, while unlikely, cannot be entirely ruled out, particularly given ideological currents that frame the conflict as existential.
Although he considers ending the war to be “the least costly and most rational option,” Al-Masri believes the chances of an immediate resolution are slim due to ongoing escalation and the lack of serious negotiations. Still, he leaves room for unexpected developments, pointing to the possibility of a “black swan” event that could suddenly change the course of the conflict.
Finally, he turns to Arab states, especially those in the Gulf, which he says have “found themselves at the heart of a war that is not theirs.” He commends their restraint in avoiding direct involvement despite external pressure. For Al-Masri, this moment is both a crisis and an opportunity. He calls for a clear Arab stance: condemning aggression, avoiding entanglement, rejecting the use of foreign military bases, and working toward a regional system based on cooperation rather than dependence. In the end, he boils it down to a simple truth: security cannot be outsourced, it must be built from within.