In a recent analysis, Mr. Hani AlMasri delves into the complexities surrounding the Palestinian cause following a UN Security Council resolution that effectively grants the United States a form of guardianship over the Gaza Strip. ALMasri Writes "The question that arises after the Security Council resolution granting international legitimacy to American guardianship over the Gaza Strip is this: How can it be handled in a way that minimizes its harm and maximizes the opportunities within it? It is not a foregone conclusion that the resolution will be implemented, or that it will be implemented in its worst form, especially since the issues it addresses are highly complex, and the parties tasked with implementing it are not moving with the same motives and objectives. There is one camp that wants to cement the ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal, halt displacement, ensure the flow of humanitarian aid, open the Rafah crossing, and begin reconstruction. This camp also seeks the exit of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) from governance, the return of the Palestinian Authority, and the opening of a credible political pathway toward establishing a Palestinian state. On the other hand, there is another camp that wants the occupation to remain—even if only in buffer zones, with Israeli control and the right to attack and intervene whenever it sees fit. This camp also seeks to keep the door open for displacement, establish a "Gaza Riviera," keep Hamas out of power and disarm it, prevent the return of the Authority, and create a Palestinian government subservient to the occupation. Nevertheless, the upper hand will belong to the White House administration, as Trump—a staunch supporter of Israel, is expected to chair the "Peace Council" and control the operations of the "Stabilization Force."

Accusations of treason come easy, as does declaring others apostates, but their consequences are disastrous for the Palestinian cause and for the possibility of building a broad national front.

Israel initially endorsed the resolution because it meets the core of its demands, and because it cannot oppose Trump. However, it did so reluctantly. International oversight of Gaza—even under American leadership biased in Israel's favor—is not its preferred option, as it restricts the freedom of its army and makes its conduct subject to the will of the "Peace Council," which aligns with the interests of the State of Israel but not with the aspirations of the ruling far-right. Netanyahu's government aims, through the war, to entrench occupation and settlement, displace Palestinians, disarm Gaza, cement its separation from the West Bank, topple Hamas rule, and impose a new Palestinian government loyal to it—one that is connected neither to Hamas nor to the Palestinian Authority, unless the Authority is restructured in accordance with Israeli-American "reform" conditions that would strip it of national representation if it complies. Therefore, Israel prefers to carry out its objectives itself to ensure the downfall of the movement's rule and its disarmament, and to keep the door open for displacement, occupation, settlement, and annexation. This is because it does not trust that the movement will respond to the "Peace Council's" requests, nor that the Council is capable of enforcing them. Israel also fears subsequent attempts to extend the Gaza model to the West Bank, and it fears a shift in the American position toward Hamas—where the White House might agree to its continued existence in exchange for conditions, including a commitment to maintain security, as Musa Abu Marzouk indicated. Such a scenario is unlikely, but it remains possible given the absence of a quick alternative to Hamas's authority.

Israel's doubts are mounting because the "Peace Council" has not yet been formed, and it may include figures from countries it does not favor. The stabilization force has also not been formed, amid Arab-Islamic hesitation to participate for fear of clashing with resistance factions. With the formation of the force stalling, the occupation continues to impose new realities on the ground. The war continues despite the ceasefire—albeit below the threshold of genocide, comprehensive destruction, and forced displacement. The delay in forming the stabilization force, Hamas's failure to exit governance, and the unresolved issue of weapons may lead the occupation to delay the entry of aid, the opening of the Rafah crossing, and the start of reconstruction. This may open the door to a de facto division of Gaza between the eastern and western areas, with the relatively less occupied western areas granted "privileges" and calculated reconstruction, while the eastern areas are left under siege and aggression. This would push residents to migrate westward in a process of "voluntary" displacement.

The Palestinian police are not ready, and there are plans to train three thousand police officers as a first batch to replace the current police force, which is rejected (according to the Israeli view) and considered affiliated with Hamas. As for the technocratic committee, there is a Palestinian-Egyptian agreement to form it under the chairmanship of a minister from the Palestinian government with national reference. However, the government is hesitant to implement it, awaiting Hamas's position on handing over weapons to the Authority—even though it is not recognized—for fear of violating the "Peace Council" and Israel, both of which stipulate that the movement relinquish governance and disarm, along with broad political "reforms" before any role for the Authority. For these reasons, Israel is banking on the failure of the resolution's implementation so it can continue its war, rely on local collaborator militias, and act as if the resolution does not exist.

It is not enough for the Palestinian Authority to welcome the resolution while Hamas and other factions oppose it. Rather, the divergence of positions can be leveraged to link the issue of disarmament to progress toward a credible pathway for establishing a Palestinian state. The absence of consensus, however, portends the success of the hostile plan, the deepening and expansion of division, and perhaps a slide into armed confrontation. The Palestinian choice today is not between a good scenario and a bad one, but between the bad and the worse. What is required is to minimize losses and avoid clashing with the international community, especially since the resolution enjoys broad Arab, Islamic, and international support, despite the differing motives of the supporting states. There is an international camp that wants the resolution to be a step toward a Palestinian state, an end to the war, withdrawal, reconstruction, and a halt to displacement—in contrast to another camp led by Netanyahu's approach, backed by America, which seeks displacement and the prevention of a Palestinian state, as it poses an existential threat in the eyes of both the Israeli government and the opposition.

The worst thing that could happen is the failure to implement the resolution without a better alternative available, because it means the continuation of the war and perhaps its expansion. The successful implementation of the resolution, despite its flaws, may be the least bad of scenarios, but it requires Palestinian consensus accompanied by painful concessions, despite the lack of sufficient guarantees that Israel will commit to ending the war, withdrawing, allowing aid and reconstruction, preventing displacement, and engaging in a credible political process. The likely outcome here, if no unexpected developments occur, is a political solution that includes less than a state and more than autonomy, with some sovereign features granted in Gaza and the disconnected enclaves in the West Bank linked together—in other words, a modified version of "Oslo."

If the Palestinians agreed on the goal of ending the occupation and embodying independence, and activated the leadership framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization, or formed a consensus government or a support committee, or even gave the Authority full responsibility while ensuring pluralism, commitment to elections, and the regulation of arms, that would be stronger than the division that loses everything. Unity—or even consensus on a low ceiling—is better than division under very low or very high ceilings. It is true that Israel has been morally and politically exposed after two years of war, and its strategic standing has deteriorated to the point that it has become closer to an American protectorate. However, a distinction must be made between its current strength (political, military, and economic) and the future of that strength, which has no guarantee. Its continuation as a racist colonial power hostile to the peoples and countries of the region and an element of instability, and the ongoing war threatening its security and even its future existence, will turn it (over time) more and more into a strategic burden on its supporters.

The claim that consensus between the "resistance and negotiation camps" is impossible deepens the division and ignores the fact that the ceiling of internal Palestinian dialogue has dropped considerably in light of the severe imbalance in the balance of power. This is because the overwhelming popular solidarity with the Palestinian cause has not been reflected on the ground of the conflict, where outcomes are decided and maps are drawn. Despite the grave mistakes of the leadership in power within the Authority and the Organization, its major concessions, its adoption of a survival strategy for itself above all else, and its failure to respond to unity initiatives, the Zionist project targets all Palestinians without exception—even collaborators among them—as evidenced by the policy of undermining the Authority, calls for its dissolution, and the arrest of its president for practicing "diplomatic terrorism," while the resistance practices "military terrorism." The Israeli "reform" conditions imposed on the Authority—in complete disregard of the Organization as if it does not exist (from changing curricula and stopping media incitement, to halting internationalization and pursuing Israel in international institutions and courts, refraining from seeking state recognition of Palestine, liquidating the pillars of Palestinian identity and narrative, to demanding the abandonment of the right of return, stopping salaries for prisoners and families of martyrs, and recognizing Israel's right to exist as a state exclusively for the Jewish people)—make it clear that Israel is hostile to the mere existence of a unified Palestinian national identity, and that it does not distinguish much between moderates and extremists. It treats Palestinians as individuals, not as a people, who must choose between migration, enslavement, or death.

Al Masri Concludes: Major strategic transformations do not come from wishful thinking, but from the maturation of the elements of change.

Despite the failure of the leadership in power, the Authority's security cooperation with the occupation, its economic dependency, and its acceptance of adapting to the security-economic ceiling of the occupation's relationship with it, Fatah (the backbone of the Authority and the Organization) remains a fundamental pillar of the national movement and cannot be written off—especially with symbolic leaders like Marwan Barghouti, who are capable (as most Palestinians from both the resistance and negotiation camps acknowledge) of reviving national unity. If the Authority implements what is required of it, it removes itself from the national ranks, and then calls to bypass and topple it would be justified.

Accusations of treason come easy, as does declaring others apostates, but their consequences are extremely dire. National unity that includes various classes, orientations, and individuals, with the exception of collaborators, as proven by the experiences of liberation movements from Algeria to Vietnam and South Africa, and the experience of the Palestinian people itself, is a condition for victory. If it cannot be achieved from the top down, then let it begin from the grassroots upward, on the basis of a minimum program, not a maximum one. The absence of unity does not prevent anyone from presenting a model through awareness and practice that constitutes an alternative that various forces and movements can emulate.

Radical change is necessary and urgent, but it requires leadership, an idea, a program, a broad national front, clear and broad popular support, and multifaceted struggle aimed at achieving victory—not just keeping the flame of resistance burning—and a suitable Arab, regional, and international strategic environment, not media rhetoric and enthusiastic revolutionary slogans that inflame internal tensions. Historical experiences (from the 1967 defeat that changed Gamal Abdel Nasser's and Arab regimes' stance from skepticism of the Palestinian revolution to supporting it, to the Battle of Karameh in 1968, which was the second major launch of the Palestinian revolution and led to overwhelming majority support for it, opening the doors to change in the leadership of the PLO, to the October 1973 war, whose results, specifically the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, opened the path for negotiations and settlement that ended with "Oslo," and what we are in now) confirm that major strategic transformations come from the maturation of the subjective and objective elements of change and the occurrence of major variables—which have happened or are on their certain path to happening, and from an accurate reading of reality and its possibilities and probabilities, not from wishful thinking and projecting it onto reality."