We are facing a war that has not been decided, as it did not lead to an agreement but only to a ceasefire. A war with no victor, because none of its parties fully achieved its goals. Its current round ended on points, not with a knockout, yet each side rushes to claim victory and that its goals have been achieved.
 
Iran can claim victory because it broke the traditional immunity of the Israeli home front, inflicting unprecedented damage in terms of time and quality, and had the last strike. Its regime also remained steadfast and maintained its regional presence, while its nuclear and missile programs suffered clear damage, but were not destroyed.
 
As for Israel, it can claim victory by delivering harsh blows to the head of the Iranian regime, weakening it by exploiting its air and intelligence superiority, and a major Iranian security loophole. It also succeeded in inflicting significant damage on the Iranian nuclear and missile programs, received direct American support in defense and offense, and succeeded, temporarily,  in separating Gaza from this confrontation, despite the deep interconnectedness between the two fronts.
 
However, all of this does not change the fact that the causes of the war have not been addressed, and the possibility of its renewal remains. Each party will try at the negotiating table to achieve what it failed to achieve on the battlefield, but negotiations – in the end – do not reflect wishes but rather the balance of power on the ground.

 
Iran After the American Aggression... Open War or Negotiation Under Fire?
 
By Hani Al Masri

 
Before the two-week ultimatum set by President Trump to decide on striking Iran ran out, American aircraft and submarines launched strikes last Sunday targeting nuclear facilities in Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz. This qualitative and dangerous escalation, which despite its significance did not decisively end the war—even if it was expected—reaffirms Trump's commitment to protecting Israel's security and regional superiority, and ensuring its monopoly on nuclear weapons while preventing Iran from acquiring them. He has once again proven himself to be evasive, deceitful, and cunning, using negotiations and deadlines as a cover to complete preparations for war and elevate the US-Israeli alliance to unprecedented levels, in a way that will constrain any future president.
 
It has become clear that this is not merely an Israeli war, but a joint American-Israeli war. This dangerous escalation could lead to one of two outcomes: either paving the way for an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, or entering a new, broader, and more dangerous phase of war, potentially escalating into an open regional or international conflict, or remaining within its traditional framework: strike for strike, awaiting which side cries out first.
 
Potential Scenarios for Iran
 
Scenario One (Most Likely):
Iran continues its bombardment of Israel, considering it the most important American base in the region, with the aim of restoring its prestige and deterrence power and pushing Israel to accept a balanced solution.
The absence of a shared land border between Iran and Israel makes a decisive victory impossible, as there can be no decisive outcome without ground forces. Therefore, changing the Iranian regime through military means appears very difficult. The Iranian opposition has seemed weak and failed to present a serious alternative; some of its prominent figures even declared that they would not come to power on the back of American-Israeli aircraft.
 
Air strikes, no matter how powerful, cannot eliminate the Iranian regime or its nuclear program; they can only delay it for months or years. Iranian leaders might choose—within a sub-scenario—to open the way for a semi-balanced solution based on prioritizing the regime's survival over the continuation of the nuclear program, which could open the door for future negotiating flexibility if conditions mature. However, what hinders this is the lack of guarantees that merely halting the nuclear program will suffice, especially if Tehran shows signs of weakness, as it is no longer possible to trust Trump's commitments.
Israel, for its part, cannot endure a long war, especially given the significant human, economic, military, and moral losses. What might explain the preference for this scenario is Iran's downplaying of the American strike's importance so as not to be blamed if it does not retaliate, and limiting its response to Israeli targets, despite the possibility of symbolic strikes against American targets in the region without human casualties. Also, the Trump administration's exaggeration of its achievement by claiming to have destroyed the nuclear program, despite evidence of enriched uranium being moved before the American aggression. This scenario might open the door for an Iranian-American agreement not to target Iranian-American objectives despite the continuation of the war, similar to the American agreement with the Houthis, as evidenced by Tehran's call for peace and the assertion that Washington will not target more Iranian objectives.
 
Scenario Two (Less Likely):
Iran expands the confrontation by attacking American bases, interests, and fleets in the Gulf, closing the Strait of Hormuz, and targeting economic and strategic objectives. This scenario would lead to a long war that could become regional and even international, reinforcing Washington's inclination towards a broader military response. It could also enable Washington to rally a regional-international coalition against Iran, and potentially involve host countries of American bases in the war. In this case, Iran might resort to supporting its regional allies—especially in Yemen—to open new fronts. This scenario is strengthened if Iran becomes convinced that American objectives are not limited to the nuclear program but also target the missile program and aim to overthrow the regime.
 
Scenario Three (Least Likely):
Tehran directly heads to the negotiating table under fire, showing great flexibility to de-escalate, preferring to preserve the regime at the expense of the nuclear program.
This scenario is weak so far, given the absence of any American or Israeli guarantees that merely halting the nuclear program will suffice, without demanding the dismantling of the missile program and regional influence, and perhaps even seeking regime change. There is an Iranian commitment to continue the nuclear program in all circumstances.
As Mehdi Mohammadi, advisor to the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, said: "Knowledge and science cannot be bombed."
 
Scenario Four (Acquiring a Nuclear Bomb):
Tehran exploits the American-Israeli aggression, despite its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to change the Supreme Leader's fatwa prohibiting the production of nuclear bombs, and begins actual production, relying on increasing internal and international support, especially given its possession of sufficient quantities of enriched uranium to produce about ten nuclear bombs.
 
What strengthens this scenario is that the world stood helpless in the face of aggression by a nuclear state (Israel) that had not even joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, against a committed member state. This prompts many Iranian voices—which have increased after the aggression—to demand the manufacture of a nuclear bomb to ensure deterrence and achieve a balance of power.
What weakens this scenario is that it would push the Trump administration to do everything necessary to prevent Iran from joining the club of nuclear states.
 
Summary of the Scene:
 
There are open paths:
 

 
What determines which scenario the Iranian leadership will choose is to remember that the components of the Islamic Republic are diverse—ideological, religious, nationalist, pragmatic—with the importance that its choice depends first on what remains of its military capabilities, especially missile capabilities, and whether it will close the intelligence and security gap and limit Israeli air superiority. An agreement will be reached when both sides are exhausted and come to the conviction that neither can achieve a knockout victory. This is available to the Iranian leadership and must be available to the Israeli government, which has greatly exaggerated its historical victory and is betting on further American involvement in the war.
 
Deception After the Aggression
 
As usual, immediately after the aggression, voices emerged proclaiming a swift, decisive American victory, claiming that Iran poses an existential threat that cannot be tolerated, and that it has lost and must admit it. Some of these voices, hours earlier, were claiming that Trump would not attack and that he would abandon Netanyahu under the slogan "America First."
 
But the truth is that Israel—nuclear-protected by America and the Western world—is not existentially threatened; rather, it is the one threatening its neighbors. Its organic relationship with the United States makes Washington ready to participate with it to achieve common goals, and unwilling to accept its defeat; instead, it will support it to win for a common goal: reshaping the Middle East according to the American-Israeli vision. Abandoning Israel will only happen if the cost of supporting it outweighs the benefits, and this is not a foreseeable matter in the immediate term, as Israel's functional role is very useful for American imperialism and its continued hegemony over the entire region.
 
"America First" or "America and Israel First"?
 
The division within America regarding participation in the war is clear, even within Trump's camp. Iran may take this into account when deciding the nature of its response, as it is between two fires. Retaliating against American targets might strengthen the position of hawks advocating for war, but it could also give a boost to the opposition rejecting military involvement for fear of entanglement in war.
 
Overthrowing the Regime is Not the End
 
Even if we assume—for argument's sake—the fall of the Iranian regime, tens of millions of supporters, soldiers, Revolutionary Guard members, and Basij forces will not vanish. Therefore, it is likely that chaos similar to what happened after the fall of Saddam will initially erupt, where resistance movements and extremist organizations emerged in a turbulent environment.
What happened in Afghanistan confirms the lesson: after 20 years of American occupation, the Taliban returned to power, even though American forces numbered over 100,000 soldiers. They withdrew defeated, leaving their clients clinging to the wings of fleeing planes. Ultimately, people want to determine their own destiny, not to have a subservient regime imposed upon them by anyone.
 
Setting Unachievable Goals
 
The fatal weakness in the American-Israeli strategy, especially during the Trump and Netanyahu eras, is that they start wars without a realistic vision of how to end them. Instead of adopting realistic, phased objectives, they propose the "maximum," and when they fail to achieve it, they also fail to retreat.
 
If Netanyahu's government had been less extreme after the Al-Aqsa Flood, it would have proposed limited goals: such as releasing prisoners, weakening Hamas, and paving the way for the return of authority to Gaza. But it seeks to destroy the entire Strip and displace its residents, as part of a plan to liquidate the entire issue. This places Palestinians, with all their factions, in the same camp under the same fire, whether they like it or not.
 
As for the American administration, if it had contented itself with preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb, an agreement could have been reached, especially since the Supreme Leader had issued a fatwa to that effect. But it wants to change the regime because it cannot tolerate the existence of a regional power competing with Israel.