ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT NATIONAL UNITY: "Cairo is likely to host new talks among Palestinian factions in an attempt to reach the agreement on national unity that has eluded them since 2007, if the obstacles around the president's conditions (which Hamas and most factions do not accept) can be overcome," remarks Palestinian commentator Hani al-Masri on Friday's PCI-(Palestinian citizens of Israel) focused news portal www.arab48.com.
After the failure of all previous reconciliation attempts in friendly Arab capitals, the question remains: Is there a real chance of success this time?
To understand the current challenges, we must return to the reasons that produced and perpetuated the split despite its existential dangers to the Palestinian people, their rights, and institutions:
Disagreements on programming: There is a split between those who view armed resistance as a primary path to liberation and those who prefer negotiations and political settlement. The dispute also appears in positions toward the Oslo Accords and the obligations they entail.
Power struggle: The split has become an institutional struggle over power, leadership, representation and budgets, not merely an expression of political, ideological and programmatic differences. The lack of geographic continuity between the West Bank and Gaza has also deepened the split and made the prospects for unity much harder.
A lack of faith in partnership: Each side waited and bet on the other's fall, which weakened institutions and turned them into clientelist tools, spreading exclusion, unilateralism, domination, corruption and nepotism.
The role of the occupation: The occupation played a central role in causing and deepening the split by imposing the equation 'either Hamas or peace,' supported by U.S. and European positions.
External intervention: The crisis was further complicated by the struggles between the regional axes of 'moderation' and 'resistance,' especially given Hamas's historical ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and its disputes with several important Arab states.
Sharp polarization between Fatah and Hamas: Fatah enjoys international and Arab legitimacy, while Hamas has popular legitimacy, particularly in the wake of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, which restored some legitimacy to the option of resistance despite its heavy cost.
Groups that benefit from the split: Broad segments and individuals profited from the continuation of the split by appropriating influence, wealth and positions in the absence of oversight and accountability institutions, the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and the weakening of PA, PLO, and factional institutions, creating a real obstacle to genuine reconciliation.
The events of October 7 increased the complexity of the scene. The official leadership increasingly adopted a posture of survival, distancing and waiting, and withdrawing pretexts for fear of toppling the PA and expanding the war to the West Bank. In contrast, Hamas showed readiness to relinquish administration of Gaza and to open up to formation of a non-factional national unity government or a community support committee, with acceptance of a long-term truce.
There have also been positive developments in the Palestinian arena, most notably, Hamas's acceptance of principles of international law and UN resolutions, and its affirmation in its 2017 political declaration 'of the goal of establishing a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders and of the independence of its decision-making from the Muslim Brotherhood. These developments open a new window for national understandings, even if disagreements over the national program, commitments and the PA's role remain deep.
Although the war has officially stopped, Israeli fighting, violations and pressures have not ceased. The blockade and control over the flow of aid, crossings, air and sea access, assassinations, bombardment, security control, and the use of ongoing negotiations to impose a new political reality that fragments the land and the people into disparate entities all continue, turning the Palestinian issue into a humanitarian, security and economic problem rather than the cause of a people fighting for national liberation and the right to self-determination. Hence the Palestinian priorities are:
--To consolidate a ceasefire and reject any foreign tutelage; full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza; upholding the unity of the West Bank and Gaza; the PA's return to affirming national identity and opening the path to achieving independence.
--To prevent the occupation from imposing its own facts and domineering agreements in the West Bank and the Strip that would close the door on the establishment of a unified Palestinian state. If things continue as they are, the West Bank and Gaza could be fragmented and partitioned into isolated population enclaves without sovereignty, or with only very limited forms of it , especially in the Gaza enclave.
--To adopt a unified national program that prioritizes the following: First, in the immediate term, providing the means of steadfastness and survival for the people and the cause and thwarting the scheme to liquidate the Palestinian cause through a plan to 'resolve' the conflict. Second, fighting to achieve the goal of independence through popular resistance, boycott, sanctions, accountability, internationalization and securing rights. Third, in the longer term, fighting for the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination, resolving the refugee problem through return and compensation, and establishing a single democratic state by defeating and dismantling the settler-colonialist project.
If an immediate 'top-down' comprehensive agreement on a program or government is not possible, barring unexpected positive developments, it is possible to start taking bottom-up and top-down preparatory steps as feasible:
--Form a unified administration marked by political and ideological pluralism that paves the way for unifying leadership and respects national interests.
--Adopt a national media charter that prevents incitement, denunciation, excommunication, exclusion, and monopolization of patriotism, religion and truth.
--Form a national unity government or a national support committee tied to the government to restore authority to Gaza.
--Create a unified negotiating delegation with the national authority to discuss 'the day after.'
--Organize joint field work to confront settlement, annexation and settlers' assaults on citizens, property and holy sites.
--Form popular and community committees and bodies on shared issues at all levels to address the effects of the genocide, destruction and displacement and stand up to plans for annexation, settlement and displacement in the West Bank and Gaza so as to rebuild according to Palestinian priorities, interests and needs.
--Prepare for local, union, university, syndicate, and association elections that pave the way for comprehensive general elections.
These steps constitute a practical foundational base on which unity can be gradually built, while veering away from rhetoric and slogans.
Achieving Palestinian unity may be politically costly for some, but it is far less costly than the continuation of a split that threatens the very existence of the national project. Unity is not a choice or a luxury but an existential national imperative that enables the Palestinian people to confront the occupation and its plans, defeat it, and reshape the Palestinian scene on the basis of partnership and genuine representation.
Success in Cairo this time is possible because regional and international actors now fear the danger Israel poses to regional security and stability under the current ultra-hardline government. The Palestinian issue has been revived, and a global alliance is forming to realize Palestinian statehood. There is an unprecedented rise in popular demands across the globe for freedom and justice for Palestinians and accountability for perpetrators of genocide and other crimes. The resistance axis has weakened and the moderation axis has shifted even if only somewhat positively. The PA in the West Bank is being undermined and the ruling establishment in Gaza has been destroyed, and Hamas is expected to leave it willingly. All the above provide better conditions for unity, provided there is political will and the courage to make mutual concessions rooted in the supreme national interest rather than narrow individual and factional considerations that hide behind crippling conditions to defend their own interests. Without unity there will be no state and no independence; the cost of unity is far less than the cost of continued division.
"Failure to achieve unity or interim concord steps opens the door to new approaches that rely more on the people and their initiatives and on the national movement with its old factions or through new formations, based on developing a viable political project that combines realism and ambition, aligns goals with appropriate forms of struggle while maintaining the right to use various forms of struggle and the right, feasibility, and capacity to bear the costs and continue the march until victory," concludes Masri.
End…
