Political analyst and columnist Hani Almasri argues that anyone following the conflict in the region—especially since October 7, 2023—cannot miss its asymmetrical nature. He points out that “there is a glaring imbalance in the balance of power between the occupation state and its American partners on one side, and Palestine with its allies, within the so-called resistance axis led by Iran, on the other.” At the same time, much of the world, including China, Russia, Europe, Canada, and Japan, largely opposes U.S.-Israeli aggression “to varying degrees,” since “this war is not theirs,” and they have not engaged directly.
Almasri emphasizes that Israel has enjoyed an overwhelming advantage from the outset: “a surplus of military, technological, and intelligence power, employing the latest weapons and AI techniques in unprecedented ways.” This has allowed Israel to achieve “notable tactical military gains,” targeting sources of strength in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iran. Yet he stresses that Israel “has gone far in its war, disregarding international law,” committing massacres and grave crimes, including genocide, apartheid, forced displacement, land confiscation, settlement expansion, and the total destruction of cities and camps, with the ultimate goal being “to liquidate the Palestinian cause at its roots.”
Despite these military successes, Almasri observes that they have not translated into political victories or strategic objectives. He notes that Iran remains resilient, “launching missiles and drones, controlling the Strait of Hormuz,” while the war against Iran continues on multiple fronts, likely to escalate and involve new actors. In Gaza, he adds, “despite more than two years of brutal aggression turning the area into an unlivable environment, Netanyahu’s government has failed to settle the battle, displace the population, or occupy the territory,” with Hamas still controlling a significant portion of land.
Almasri draws a historical lesson: “People who are subjected to aggression, stand on the side of justice, and possess the will to endure and challenge, are always more capable of enduring and ultimately triumphing.”
In Lebanon, despite severe strikes and assassinations of key figures, including the historic leader Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah “managed to reorganize, regain the initiative, and even surprise everyone by imposing new field equations.” Almasri points out that if Israel had pursued a different strategy rather than continuing the war, while Hezbollah maintained a ceasefire and controlled multiple Lebanese positions, it could have enhanced the legitimacy of the resistance. He stresses, “Israel’s ambitions in Lebanon are not linked to security threats; it seeks not Arab partners or allies, but only agents under its control.”
In Syria, Israel “preferred to expand occupation and buffer zones, supporting fragmentation tendencies, rather than seizing the opportunity to build relations with the new, more open Syrian regime,” thus missing a strategic opportunity. Regarding Iran, Almasri notes that “despite heavy bombing, destruction, and massive losses, the declared and hidden objectives have not been achieved, not in the nuclear program, not in missile capabilities, nor in changing the behavior of the regime, and certainly not in toppling it or forcing submission.”
He explains the gap between military dominance and political results with several factors. First, the nature of the war is crucial: “Is it just or unjust? A war of necessity, imposed and existential, or an optional war that could have been avoided?” Almasri stresses that historically, “peoples and countries exposed to aggression, standing on the side of justice, and possessing resilience, are always better positioned to endure and ultimately triumph,” citing the Vietnamese and Algerian revolutions as examples.
Second, there is often a mismatch between ambitions and capabilities. Projects such as Greater Israel, reshaping the Middle East, displacing Palestinians, eliminating resistance, or toppling Iran exceed realistic power, attract new adversaries, and unify opposition, creating a gap between aspirations and outcomes.
Third, setting unrealistic objectives has hindered political achievements. Almasri explains that if Israel had focused on more achievable goals, weakening Iran’s capabilities, limiting its nuclear and missile programs, containing Iranian influence, weakening resistance in Lebanon and Palestine, or reconfiguring the Palestinian political scene, it could have achieved tangible political results, and perhaps even internal shifts within Iran, Lebanon, or Palestine, preventing the emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state.”
Fourth, the conflict with Iran is broader than nuclear or missile issues: “The main goal is imposing U.S.-Israeli dominance and eliminating Iranian independence, while curbing China’s strategic benefits from Iranian oil and its role in the Belt and Road project.” Almasri emphasizes that Iran cannot be subdued with a single strike; it requires multiple operations and a long-term strategy, similar to Iraq, which has yet to materialize.
Fifth, the global system is shifting. We are in a transitional period in which “the old international order, established after World War II and dominated by the bipolar Cold War framework, has eroded,” while the U.S. struggles to maintain leadership amid China’s rise, causing strategic confusion and widening conflict dimensions.
Sixth, leadership crises and populism are at play. Almasri criticizes elites in Washington and Tel Aviv for “declining strategic awareness, replaced by populist, ideologically extreme, religiously rigid factions” who prioritize self-interest, power, and re-election over national goals. In Israel, he notes, the military wields disproportionate influence over decision-making, favoring short-term military solutions at the expense of long-term political strategy, exacerbated by sharp polarization between extremist religious-nationalist and liberal-secular currents.
In conclusion, Almasri asserts: “What we are witnessing today is not merely a conventional war, but part of a historical labor pain for the birth of a new regional and global order.” He warns that “even immense military power cannot guarantee political victories, as the American empire enters a stage of decline, old tools and instruments are no longer sufficient, and the contours of the new order remain undefined.”