Hani Almasri, in a recent article discussing the upcoming conference of Fatah, argued that the movement now stands “before three possibilities: continuing to tread water, rising again, or the conference becoming the final curtain call.” He suggested that the prospect of revival is “highly unlikely,” because, in his assessment, Fatah has abandoned its national project and “melted into the Authority,” which has become focused on integration into “the regional political and security order led by the United States and dominated by Israel.”
According to Almasri, the Palestinian Authority evolved into “a hybrid that combines repression, corruption, rejection of political participation, and avoidance of elections unless their results are guaranteed.” He further argued that the Authority bypassed national consensus that could have offered a degree of legitimacy, while simultaneously suspending resistance and maintaining security coordination “even in the absence of a political process.”
Reporting on the atmosphere surrounding the preparations for the eighth conference, Almasri stated that organizational matters and internal competition over seats in the conference, the Central Committee, and the Revolutionary Council “overshadowed everything else.” By contrast, he noted that “the political program, the national project, economic, social, and cultural dimensions, and Israeli plans aimed at liquidating the Palestinian cause from its roots” were not at the forefront of attention, despite the gravity of the current Palestinian situation.
Almasri stressed that “the political program is the central issue,” especially because the conference is taking place under exceptionally dangerous and complicated circumstances for the Palestinian cause. He argued that “the national project is the greatest absentee from the ongoing discussions and preparations,” despite the fact that answering essential questions , such as where the Palestinian people stand today, what national goals should be pursued, and by what forms of resistance and strategies those goals can be achieved, should constitute the conference’s main concern.
He warned that the inability to answer these questions raises doubts about whether the Palestinian national movement can continue in its current form or whether it requires “renewal, or perhaps even a new birth.” In his words, “if the movement does not know where it is heading, how can it possibly move in the right direction and achieve the goals of the Palestinian people?”
Almasri argued that the absence of a renewed national vision leaves the current political path intact , namely, “a program of survival and waiting,” based on “withdrawing pretexts, proving worthiness, and clinging to the tails of a political process that died long ago.” He criticized what he described as a policy of avoiding unavoidable confrontations and warned that, unless the national project is revived or redefined according to current realities and lessons learned, Palestinians will continue adapting to realities imposed by the occupation “without seeking to change them.”
He cited the spread of phrases such as “something, anything, is better than nothing,” “the eye cannot resist the awl,” and “we live in the American era” as evidence of a broader political mentality shaped by defeat and lowered expectations. Almasri added that, while the Palestinian leadership warns against the “quick death” resulting from the events of October 7 and the Gaza war, its own policies have instead led Palestinians toward “a slow death, accompanied by the loss of spirit and will.”
Looking back at the origins of Fatah, Almasri recalled that, at its launch on January 1, 1965, “the goal of complete liberation through armed struggle was the national project.” He explained that this project required reviving Palestinian national identity and mobilizing Palestinians within one framework embodied by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which became recognized as “the sole legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people.
He described Fatah at that stage as “a broad national front” that included all sectors of Palestinian society “without discrimination,” to the point that “every Palestinian who did not belong to another faction was considered Fatah, even if not organizationally affiliated with it.”
Almasri also linked the rise of the Palestinian national movement to the broader regional and international climate of the 1950s through the 1980s, marked by anti-colonial struggles, the rise of progressive movements, and the bipolar international system during the Cold War. He noted that even the Arab defeat of June 1967 indirectly contributed to a “second launch” of the Palestinian revolution after the Battle of Karameh in 1968, as Arab regimes sought to compensate for the consequences of defeat by supporting the Palestinian movement.
Discussing the political evolution of the Palestinian movement, Almasri noted that some observers consider the adoption of the Ten-Point Program in 1974 , which called for establishing national authority on any liberated part of Palestine , as the beginning of the decline that culminated in the Oslo Accords. However, he argued that this interpretation is “not entirely accurate,” because the adoption of the phased program “did not coincide with abandoning the strategic program or resistance as the principal means of changing the balance of power.”
According to Almasri, the real turning point came with Oslo and the establishment of a Palestinian Authority operating under occupation. He described Oslo as a “disastrous” agreement that transformed the Palestinian national movement “from a liberation movement into an authority.” In his assessment, establishing a politically, economically, and security-restricted authority , in the absence of genuine Israeli willingness to reach a settlement , caused the preservation of the Authority itself to overshadow the national project.
He argued that, had the issue been merely political, Palestinians could have combined negotiations and resistance, realism and ambition, and short-term and long-term goals. In his view, “it was not necessary to recognize Israel under the conditions in which recognition took place,” nor to accept “an interim agreement without guarantees for a final settlement that included the establishment of a Palestinian state.”
Almasri further maintained that even factions that initially opposed Oslo, including Hamas, gradually became trapped in “the impossible combination between authority and armed resistance.” As a result, he said, “the struggle over authority became the defining feature of the last three decades.”
He warned that a political activist seeking promotion and privileges within the Authority “cannot preserve his militant spirit” within a structure that rewards loyalty over competence and fears any genuine form of struggle that could threaten its stability. With the disappearance of a political horizon, he argued, the Authority gradually became “an end in itself” and little more than “an administration managing the lives of a population under occupation.”
Referring to developments following the war in Gaza, Almasri warned that the continued absence of self-criticism and political change risks “emptying the Authority of its national content,” while also increasing the possibility of its collapse or fragmentation into localized entities. He therefore argued that expecting a genuine revival of Fatah while it remains “at the mercy of the Authority” is unrealistic, especially after “the exclusion of thousands of activists and competent figures.”
At the same time, Almasri emphasized that “the alternative does not lie in returning to the past, because the past does not return.” Instead, he called for “formulating a new national project” rooted in current realities, capable of rebuilding national unity, institutions, and leadership, while combining steadfastness with political and popular struggle and preserving Palestinian historical rights and narrative.
Recognizing the difficulty of rapidly reaching agreement on a final political program, Almasri suggested beginning with consensus on confronting “the existential dangers threatening everyone,” strengthening resilience and dignified living conditions, protecting rights and freedoms, and safeguarding Palestinians from violence committed by Israeli forces and armed settlers. He also called for “a comprehensive and continuous national dialogue” aimed at achieving agreement on what is possible while continuing discussions over unresolved issues “until a new social contract is reached.”
In conclusion, Almasri asserted that it is “no longer true that Fatah leads the Authority or the Organization,” arguing instead that the movement is now used merely “to provide legitimacy” to institutions whose legitimacy has itself become deeply eroded in the absence of a unified national project, elections, national consensus, and tangible achievements. He also warned that reports concerning efforts to secure a seat on Fatah’s Central Committee for the son of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas , potentially signaling a move toward political inheritance , would, if true, constitute “an extremely dangerous matter for Fatah, the Authority, and the Palestinian cause.”