In his recent article, Hani Al-Masri argues that one of the few positive outcomes of the Eighth Fatah Conference was that it created an opportunity to raise what he calls the “big questions” that the conference itself brushed aside and that other actors within the Palestinian national movement have not addressed with the seriousness they deserve.
At the heart of these questions is whether the Palestinian national movement can still be reformed, renewed, rebuilt, or fundamentally transformed—or whether time has already overtaken the possibility of meaningful reform. If reform is no longer sufficient, Al-Masri asks whether there is a need for the birth of a new national movement and, if so, what conditions and requirements would make such a project possible.
According to Al-Masri, the urgency of these questions stems from the fact that the Palestinian national movement, in all its ideological and strategic variations, has reached a dead end. Despite the significant differences between the strategy of resistance and the strategy of negotiations, “Palestine has not been liberated, nor has any part of it achieved complete liberation, and an independent Palestinian state has not been realized.” He argues that Palestinians now face an even more difficult reality characterized by continued displacement and destruction, creeping annexation in the West Bank, and the erosion of Palestinian institutions despite “immense sacrifices, heroic steadfastness, and courageous resistance.”
More troubling, in his view, is that while the crisis is evident, no influential actor has yet put forward a credible alternative path capable of inspiring confidence or opening a realistic horizon for achieving national goals.
Al-Masri extends this line of questioning to the future of the Palestine Liberation Organization. He asks whether the PLO can be revived through rebuilding and democratizing its institutions on the basis of genuine partnership, or whether Palestinians need an entirely new national umbrella institution that reflects contemporary realities and the lessons learned from past experiences.
He contends that the PLO has effectively been placed “in the freezer” for a long time. Its institutions, he argues, have been hollowed out, turning it into an exclusionary framework rather than a genuinely inclusive national body. Instead of the Palestinian Authority serving as an instrument of the PLO in the struggle to end the occupation, he suggests that the relationship has been reversed, with the PLO increasingly functioning as a tool of an authority tasked primarily with administering a population under occupation.
Another central issue raised by Al-Masri concerns sequencing: should Palestinians first develop a comprehensive new national vision, or should they first build a representative national institution capable of carrying that vision forward?
He rejects the assumption that existing national constants alone are sufficient. Much has changed since the PLO’s founding in 1964 and the era of national liberation movements, bipolar international politics, and rising progressive forces. The Palestinian, regional, and international landscape has undergone profound transformations, making it necessary to reassess inherited assumptions.
While he acknowledges that, in principle, vision may come first, he argues that institution-building may be more urgent from the standpoint of practical implementation. In the Palestinian case, he suggests that the immediate starting point should be agreement on the key questions rather than premature consensus on final answers.
He writes that recognizing the national project's “deep, structural, comprehensive crisis” and agreeing on the need to rebuild national representation, redefine the national project, renew the political program, and adopt more effective forms of struggle could provide the foundation for launching a new national trajectory.
For Al-Masri, a broad national institution cannot be built without at least a minimum degree of agreement on fundamental issues: What is the central organizing objective? What subsidiary goals flow from it? What is the nature of the current phase? Should the immediate priority be survival, steadfastness, and thwarting hostile plans, or pursuing broader national objectives? What role should a new national institution play?
Without answers to such questions, he warns, any umbrella framework risks becoming merely a container for contradictions, ultimately leading to paralysis, fragmentation, or gradual disintegration. At the same time, he emphasizes that a vision without an institutional carrier remains little more than an idea. Conversely, an institution without a vision becomes “an empty shell” or a battleground for competing interests.
Rather than choosing between vision and institution, Al-Masri advocates pursuing both simultaneously. He calls for the creation of what he describes as a “historical nucleus”—a coalition of political forces, public figures, grassroots initiatives, and movements that can agree on a minimum common vision while beginning to build an inclusive framework and act without delay.
Turning to the content of the vision itself, Al-Masri stresses that no single vision possesses absolute correctness. Instead, the goal should be to formulate a vision that is most capable of responding to current challenges, achieving broad national consensus, and generating political effectiveness.
He argues that developing such a vision must begin not with aspirations but with rigorous analysis. Palestinians must ask: What is the nature of the conflict today? What distinguishes it from previous stages? What is the Palestinian narrative, rooted in the unity of the cause, the land, and the people? What are the core rights and overarching national goals? What are the existing and emerging balances of power? What can realistically be achieved now, and what objectives should be deferred to later stages?
He also emphasizes the need to identify the resources, tools, and forms of struggle available to Palestinians that can achieve objectives “in the shortest time and at the lowest cost.” While the Palestinian struggle must retain its distinctly Palestinian character, he argues that it also possesses Arab, Islamic, humanitarian, and global liberation dimensions. Accordingly, he rejects both excessive insistence on absolute Palestinian decision-making independence and the opposite tendency of dissolving the Palestinian cause into broader regional or international frameworks.
Al-Masri further asks why previous initiatives and movements, whether launched from within established factions or outside them, have failed to reform, renew, or replace the existing national movement. Understanding these failures, he suggests, is essential for any future effort to succeed.
Another key component of his proposed framework is strategic flexibility. The Palestinian cause, he argues, should not be reduced to a single option or one exclusive solution. Instead, the door should remain open to different approaches and outcomes that advance Palestinian rights and national interests in accordance with changing realities.
He also calls for a comprehensive critical review of the Palestinian national experience from its inception to the present day, coupled with a serious study of international liberation movements—their successes as well as their failures. Building consensus around shared principles, rather than waiting for complete agreement on every issue, should be the guiding approach.
Indeed, Al-Masri suggests that agreeing on a method for producing and continuously refining a national vision may be more important than drafting the vision itself. A vision, he argues, is not a sacred text or a final document but rather a living framework subject to revision and development as circumstances change.
To this end, he advocates an ongoing national dialogue grounded in democratic partnership, mutual respect, and rejection of exclusion, accusations of treason, religious excommunication, and monopolization of patriotism or truth. Such a dialogue should involve representatives from across Palestinian society, including politicians, intellectuals, youth, women, labor unions, universities, research centers, respected public figures, and the private sector.
A significant section of Al-Masri’s article is devoted to challenging the widespread assumption that democracy and elections alone can solve the Palestinian political crisis. While affirming the importance of democratic processes and regular elections, he argues that the unique realities of the Palestinian situation make elections, under current conditions, “insufficient and potentially misleading if regarded as the entry point or magic solution.”
He points out that roughly half of the Palestinian people live under the authority of a settler-colonial and discriminatory state, while Palestinian communities are fragmented across multiple legal and political realities. The separation of Jerusalem from the rest of the occupied territories, the division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the distinction between Palestinians inside Israel and those elsewhere, and the separation of Palestinians in the homeland from those in exile all create profound structural obstacles to genuinely representative elections.
Moreover, Al-Masri argues that both the occupation authorities and the Palestinian Authority impose various restrictions on electoral processes. The occupation can prevent candidates from running, arrest candidates and elected representatives, and ultimately ensure that elected institutions lack genuine sovereignty. In his words, what is permitted is the administration of a population under occupation, not the exercise of self-determination or the realization of rights such as return, equality, and independence.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that many countries hosting Palestinian refugees do not permit comprehensive Palestinian elections on their territory. For this reason, Al-Masri contends that the most realistic democratic model in current circumstances is consensual democracy rather than reliance on elections alone.
Consequently, he argues that elections should be viewed as one important component of a broader solution and part of the struggle to end occupation—not as a substitute for that struggle. The priority, he maintains, should be creating the political and national conditions necessary for free, fair, comprehensive elections whose results are respected.
He underscores this point by noting that “those who set the rules of the game before it begins largely determine the outcome.” He warns that elections conducted under current conditions may produce representative institutions that are distorted, fail to genuinely reflect the will of the Palestinian people, and end up legitimizing rather than transforming the existing political order.
Al-Masri concludes by presenting his article as an initial contribution to a broader intellectual and political conversation about the Palestinian condition. He expresses hope that raising these and other fundamental questions will help stimulate a comprehensive national dialogue capable of producing a new vision and a national path able to confront current challenges, address mounting risks, and advance Palestinian aspirations.