Unless a surprising development occurs, a temporary de-escalation agreement in Gaza is expected to be reached in the coming days. President Trump may announce this agreement during Benjamin Netanyahu's visit, who arrived yesterday in the United States (these lines were written before the visit). If announced, attention over the next sixty days, and beyond, will turn to exploring "day-after scenarios." The Israeli government, supported by the American administration, will seek to achieve political gains that translate the results of the genocidal war, transforming the Gaza Strip into an expelling and uninhabitable area. A political effort will be made to complete what the daily massacres, starvation, thirst, and all forms of collective punishment failed to achieve.
It is well-known that negotiations either succeed, remain negotiations for the sake of negotiations, or fail and leave things as they are. If they succeed, they usually reflect the realities on the ground and the balance of power. The results of negotiations are not determined solely by the negotiator's efficiency or weakness, despite its importance, as a weak negotiator may lose more than necessary and fail to achieve what could be achieved, and an efficient negotiator may improve the negotiating terms, but usually, it is not possible to achieve (in essence) the opposite of what is on the ground. Based on this, the first step must be an accurate reading of the reality to know what is possible and what is not.
Since the Israeli occupation forces invaded Lebanon (1982), the "New Middle East" began to form.
A realistic reading of the current reality, 21 months after the Al-Aqsa Flood, despite the legendary steadfastness and valiant resistance, indicates the weakness of the Palestinian negotiator's position, as evidenced by the extent of destruction and death, the occupation of two-thirds of the Strip, the continuation and deepening of division, the absence of a clear Palestinian vision, the dilemma of leaderships, institutions, and programs without opening a new path, the Arab impotence that sometimes reaches complicity, and international contradictions. On the one hand, the international community (despite its theoretical supportive stance for Palestinian rights) is unable to act, despite the massive and unprecedented popular solidarity with Palestine, and the condemnation of Israel even in international courts and institutions and from the West, including within the United States and Europe, which has prompted European countries to take unprecedented punitive stances and measures against Israel.
On the other hand, parties of the Axis of Resistance, including Iran, have received strong blows, despite their steadfastness in the war. But, they have also delivered harsh missile strikes against vital targets in various places in Israel, and prevented Washington and Tel Aviv from achieving their goals, which are to destroy the nuclear and missile programs, overthrow the regime or force it into submission or create internal strife, as evidenced by the widespread rallying around the regime. However, the cessation of the war was not accompanied by an agreement, but only a ceasefire agreement, and the issues that preceded it are still on the table afterwards. This means that the war was not decisive, and each party achieved points that allow it to claim victory. The region and the world have previously witnessed wars that were not decisive, such as the Korean War in the fifties of the last century, which is still without a peace agreement, or the Iraq War, the first of which ended with the expulsion of Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait in 1991, then the second which ended with the overthrow of the regime in 2003. As for the October War (1973), it was not militarily decisive, but was politically resolved years after Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, and the signing of the peace agreement thereafter (1979), with which Egypt regained Sinai under restrictions, and withdrew from the conflict and war, which left the Arab parties (including the Palestinian party) exposed, so the occupation forces invaded Lebanon in 1982, and since that date, the "New Middle East" began to form, which is a long-term historical process, advancing at times and retreating at others.
Israel, despite the achievements it has made and the strengths and superiority it possesses, and that it is a functional entity serving a global colonial project led by the United States, collides with the reality that its expansionist ambitions and its quest for regional hegemony are greater than its capabilities to achieve them. It is a small country with a small population, suffering from many weaknesses and internal contradictions, and that it is a foreign body planted in the Arab region, and cannot be absorbed into it unless its colonial-settler nature and its functional role change, and the presence of more than seven million Palestinians in their homeland, Palestine, who are not willing to leave, or to become slaves, and are determined to steadfastness and continue the struggle to achieve their goals.
Based on this, it is likely that the region is heading towards one of the following scenarios: either the continuation of the status quo without a settlement between Iran and Israel, or reaching a settlement in which each party achieves some of its demands or the subjugation of Iran by soft means, over years, or the outbreak of a new war to achieve what was not achieved in the 12-day war, or the continuation of the "battles between wars" policy. But what has become clear is that a kind of "deterrence balance" has been achieved, temporarily or permanently halting the American-Israeli impetus, and this depends on the course of regional and international events in the coming years, towards redrawing the map of the Middle East, in a way dominated by Israel, or creating a kind of regional and international pluralism and balance.
The worst for Israel is the return of the Authority to Gaza in an internal Palestinian consensus and Arab-international support.
Also, Arab countries, especially the Gulf ones, must act on the basis that they are now in a better negotiating position than they were before the war. If Iran had been defeated, Israel would have been more aggressive towards everyone, even those who normalized with it, and would have been more capable of advancing towards liquidating the Palestinian issue in all its components. As for Israel, after 21 months of war, Tel Aviv has not achieved its goals despite its military achievements. Even in Syria, where the regime completely changed, and an anti-Iranian regime replaced it, it is not likely that the new regime will conclude a peace treaty with Israel, because it does not possess sufficient power, nor the legitimacy that enables it to take such major steps, but the most it can do is a security truce agreement. In Lebanon, there are no signs of normalization and disarmament of Hezbollah, but the possibilities are open, including the return of war. The relative decline in security threats may allow the Saudi leadership to adhere to its position: no normalization without the establishment of a Palestinian state, which is impossible for the current Israeli government to agree to.
It seems that the chances of the Likud party are increasing in the upcoming elections, in light of an opposition that does not differ much from it in its extremism, and is united by one goal, which is to get rid of Netanyahu without adopting an alternative vision, which makes the scenario of Netanyahu's victory in the upcoming elections plausible. In this context, it will not be possible to achieve major achievements in other tracks, so Israel will focus on achieving political gains in the Palestinian track. While it realizes (or will realize sooner or later) the difficulty of achieving maximalist goals, such as the complete occupation of Gaza and imposing military rule, or displacement and annexation and liquidating the Palestinian issue, although it will keep the door open for that, it will come down from the tree, and try to achieve minimal goals, such as annexing parts of the West Bank, and maintaining security control in Gaza, especially through controlling buffer zones, and strategic axes, particularly at the Egyptian-Palestinian border, and those connecting the occupation state and the Gaza Strip.
It will also seek to deal with Gaza as it deals with the West Bank and Lebanon: continued siege, bombardment, assassinations, incursions, and pushing things towards chaos and internal fighting, without entering into a costly direct human occupation for the occupation army forces, and without endangering the lives of Israeli detainees, noting that it has not achieved its goals despite the Israeli army exhausting what can be achieved, as its leaders say, who prefer a temporary agreement that opens the way to ending the war. It is expected that we will witness (especially if the exchange agreement is concluded and does not fail) intensified attempts to overthrow the rule of the Hamas movement, disarm it and the resistance, and remove the remaining leaders outside the Strip. However, the main Israeli weakness, which limits (if not prevents) the achievement of Israeli goals, is the absence of a political alternative to "Hamas" in Gaza. The far-right government does not want (or is unable) to bear the cost of direct occupation and imposing military rule, and has failed to find local elements to take over the rule, so Yasser Abu Shabab's militia will collapse if the occupation forces redeploy their forces, which is why Netanyahu demanded the establishment of tent cities in Rafah, and the displacement of residents from the north to the south, and the continued Israeli control in several important axes, because the client militias cannot operate or survive except under direct Israeli protection, just as its reliance on families and tribes failed, and Israel does not agree to the return of the Authority, and still refuses to place Gaza under Arab or Arab-international guardianship, because the countries nominated to participate, or most of them at least, do not accept that, because it will provide cover for the continuation of the occupation or Israeli security control.
A kind of "deterrence balance" has been achieved, and if Iran had been defeated, Israel would have been more aggressive towards everyone.
Netanyahu's government fears that it will ultimately find itself forced to accept the continued presence of "Hamas" in the Strip, whether in or out of power, but with the ability to influence and control. If it continues to reject the return of the Authority or Arab guardianship, it may find itself facing this reality, so preparation for the scenario of renewed war after the end of the 60-day period, or after its extension, is necessary, although that will be difficult due to the emergence of internal Israeli-Palestinian, regional, and international (especially American) momentum, which will not help in resuming the war at least in the form it was. The worst scenario for Israel is the return of the Authority to Gaza within the framework of internal Palestinian consensus, and Arab-international support, because it embodies the Palestinian national identity in one entity, and keeps the door of the Palestinian state open. This scenario must be worked on by Palestinians, by every loyal national Palestinian who wants to protect the cause, land, and people, and every Palestinian who does not want to surrender and become an agent of the occupation, for the "renewed" Authority, which the occupation state may agree to, is one that accepts to be a cover for the Israeli solution, whether in the form of a decisive plan, or a plan derived from conflict management and reduction theories, which a new Israeli government with a different coalition led by Netanyahu or others may adopt, and it does not differ from its predecessor except that it tries to achieve what can be achieved by Israel now, because achieving a complete resolution of the conflict is not possible, neither now, nor in the future.
This threat is increased by an international movement led by Saudi Arabia and France to hold an international conference for the establishment of a Palestinian state, before the end of this year, as a condition for stability, cooperation, and regional peace. It is true that this movement faces Israeli rejection supported by Washington, but if the extremist Netanyahu government falls, and a government led by Naftali Bennett comes, adopting a "conflict management and reduction" approach instead of "resolution," we may return to a stage of conflict management without a solution, or a narrow window may open for a "settlement" between Palestinian-Arab-international positions, and the Israeli-American position.